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Summary 
 
The question of secondary liability of internet intermediaries for illegal 
content online is closely linked to the enjoyment of freedom of expression 
that has to be guaranteed both online and offline. The provisions concerning 
internet service providers’ liability in Europe include ‘notice and take down’ 
procedure, blocking measures and injunctions against intermediaries, which 
are all well-designed to protect right holders, however these rules do not 
properly take into consideration the concerns of securing freedom of speech 
on the internet.  
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the current role of fundamental freedom 
of expression in shaping the rules of ISP liability with the focus on 
copyright infringements online. The questions to answer are inter alia what 
is the relationship between two European courts when it comes to the 
interpretation of fundamental rights and freedoms; whether internet service 
providers can rely on the arguments deriving from freedom of expression in 
order to defend themselves against claims of copyright infringement, and 
whether internet intermediaries should be able to rely on these arguments 
based on their special role of providing access to information and cultural 
goods in information society.  
In order to answer these questions, current thesis concludes that current 
rules governing internet service providers in the European Union overlook 
the arguments of freedom of expression and do restrict the enjoyment of this 
basic right perhaps too much than necessary. In addition these provisions 
are outdated and rigid in order to be applicable to the rapid technological 
changes and the variety of available internet services. In order to overcome 
these shortcomings, current thesis focuses on the possibility to introduce a 
new exception to copyright protection based on public interest that could 
include the widest range of internet intermediaries that could be exempted 
from the liability for third parties’ copyright infringements online.  
Finally, current thesis concludes that the introduction of new exception is 
impeded by the adopted harmonising legislation in the European Union, and 
by the current international interpretation of the three-step test in TRIPS 
Agreement. However, these obstacles do not mean that the state of law has 
to stay unchanged.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Problem statement 
 
It is not surprising that in the age of information, the issue of responsibility 
of internet service providers (‘ISP’) for the illegal conduct on the internet 
has become an important question to answer. The World Wide Web is 
broad, wild and borderless as much as the irresponsibility of its users. 
Although one could wish for virtual reality to stay of some kind of terra 
nullius for responsibility, issues like piracy, defamation, hate speech, 
distribution of child pornography are real to combat online as much as 
offline.  
Here comes in the question of who is responsible for the irresponsible, or 
how it is possible to ‘clean’ the internet from the illegal content. ISP have a 
central two-way role to play in this issue: in order to secure the rights of the 
right holders from ongoing and further infringements of their legitimate 
rights on one hand, and to protect the rights of the users whose not less 
fundamental rights might be violated by excessive “witch hunt” of online 
infringers.  
In addition to much discussed concerns over data protection and users’ 
privacy issues that ISP liability rules can threaten, a strict approach of 
“catch them all” can also pose a threat to the presumption of innocence if 
automatic sanctions are placed, i.e. when uploader is automatically 
perceived as infringer.  
The question of ISP responsibility does not only include the question 
whether ISP are responsible for online copyright infringements or not, but 
the issue is closely linked to the question of what should be done in order to 
stop or prevent the further infringements online. In this regard, ISP may 
acquire some additional duties to monitor the conduct of the users of their 
services, and to block the access to particular websites and to the content 
therein whatsoever.  
As ISP can be any possible online service provider, including broadband 
providers who solely provide users with internet access, or social network 
platform who provide content related services, including file-sharing 
possibilities, as well as the actual file-sharing trackers, the consequences of 
these additional duties placed on ISP in order to secure the rights of 
copyright holders may be extensive and no doubt detrimental to the 
enjoyment of other human rights by the more significant part of population 
than the solely affected right holders, inter alia to the users’ human right to 
seek, receive and impart information. 
There is no doubt that in the age of information, information is a public 
good. Information has become the most important material for decision-
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making process of any kind: economic, social, or political, and the access to 
such information is an essential part of citizenship.1  
In addition, internet and the information it contains are at the core of the 
global economy, as internet is not only a public good, but a very precious 
one.2 However, market efficiency cannot be the only value worth of 
consideration when assessing ISP liability.  
It is also problematic to assume that only traditional ‘media’, particularly 
news making industry (newspapers or television), can be granted a 
maximum protection that is derived from the public interest. Access to the 
information is no longer dependent on so much of these classical 
intermediaries, but is achieved directly from the source instead.3  
Based on a broad definition of ISP which includes any service provider on 
the internet, the actual access to different kind of information may depend 
on the conduct of the provider, as well as from the duties placed on ISP in 
order to stop and/or prevent illegal conduct online.  
Hence, the liability of ISP for the illegal conduct online has an impact to a 
wider enjoyment of human rights online in general, and the freedom of 
expression as the right to seek, receive and impart information in particular.  
 
1.2. The scope and underlying rationale 
 
This thesis will focus on the question of ISP liability and its connection to 
the freedom of expression, and mostly to the freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information. The focus will be also placed on the copyright 
infringements, as this intellectual property (‘IP’) is mostly protecting the 
goods of such information that fall under the right to seek, impart and 
receive: namely artistic, literary, and scientific works.  
Another rationale to choose the relationship between these competing 
interests is the fact that both freedom of expression and copyright, i.e. under 
auspice of right to property, are equated in the scale of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms in Europe under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (‘ECHR’)4, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
                                                 
1 Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, “Copyright and Freedom of Expression: An Ambiguous 
Relationship”, 18 European Business Law Review (2007), 351–362, 357f.  
2 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: the open internet and net neutrality in Europe”, COM(2011) 222, 19 April 2011. 
3 Zeno-Zencovich, 358. 
4 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocols Nos. 11, 14, and supplemented by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, signed on 
4 November 1950.  
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Union (‘EU Charter’)5. The United Nations (‘UN’) instruments, that take a 
slightly different stand on the relationship between human rights and IP 
rights, will be used complementarily to European instruments, as the focus 
will be on European regional legislation.  
Another rationale is that both copyright and freedom of expression are not 
absolute and both are subject to the limitations and exceptions. Hence there 
is no automatic precedence of any of these rights over each other. 
However, if the protection of copyright is considered to be a human right, 
then the protection itself is not based on any human rights treaties. Thus in 
order to capture the essence of copyright and its protection, an additional 
look into the international copyright framework under auspice of the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (‘WIPO’) and the World Trade 
Organisation (‘WTO’) treaties, namely the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works6, and the TRIPS Agreement7, 
must be done, as well as into the regional EU legislation.  
In addition, current thesis will focus on possible public interest exception to 
copyright that could derive from the human right to seek, receive and impart 
information, i.e. freedom of expression, in the question of ISP responsibility 
for copyright infringements online. As expressed by Sunimal Mendis, the 
success of knowledge based society and its order is vitally founded on the 
ability of its members to freely access information as well as to use and 
disseminate such information in the public interest, thus on the freedom of 
expression and the right to information.8 Fundamental rights and freedoms, 
e.g. freedom of expression, must be taken more into consideration while 
assessing the responsibility of ISP, as the existing list of exceptions of 
public interest might not take into consideration the rapid changes of 
technology and the modern means of dissemination of culture and 
information.  
 
1.3. The purpose  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse whether European legislation is in 
need of a new exception in addition to the already existing list of exceptions 
to the copyright protection, in order to strike a balance between two 
competing interests deriving from the protection of copyright, as well as the 
                                                 
5 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, 30 March 2010.  
6 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted on 9 
September 1889, amended on 28 September 1979.  
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, signed in Morocco 
on 15 April 1994. 
8 Sunimal Mendis, Copyright, the Freedom of Expression and the Right to Information: 
Exploring a Potential Public Interest Exception to Copyright in Europe (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2011), 81. 
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right to property on one hand, and freedom of expression on the other, based 
inter alia on rapid technological change and development of the internet. In 
this regard the purpose of the current thesis is first to analyse lex lata 
concerning the liability of ISP whilst stressing the current inclusion or 
perhaps exclusion of freedom of expression into this question, and secondly 
to contemplate on possible lex ferenda with the link to further broader 
inclusion of freedom of expression into this debate.  
  
1.4. The research question 
 
The research questions of this thesis is thus whether ISP can in practice rely 
on the arguments deriving from the freedom of expression in order to 
defend themselves against the claims of copyright infringements, based on 
the existing state of law in Europe, and whether ISP should be able to rely 
on these arguments, i.e. the possible role of freedom of expression in 
shaping the liability of ISP for copyright infringements online, including the 
possibility of wider public interest exception to copyright.  
 
1.5. Delimitations 
 
As already briefly mentioned before, current thesis will focus mainly on 
European regulations in both fields of copyright, as well as human rights 
instruments. However, the ongoing debate over ISP responsibility according 
to the doctrine of fair use that is widely used in the United States (‘US’) will 
be assessed only to the extent it is applicable to European context.  
 
1.6. Method and outline 
 
The method used in this thesis is the traditional legal method, i.e. the EU 
legal method of applying statutory legislation and principles developed by 
European regional courts to interpret and systemise the existing body of law 
concerning copyright protection online.  
In order to strike the balance between several competing interests deriving 
from copyright and freedom of expression, the focus of current thesis is on 
EU directives and other international agreements when it comes to statutory 
legislation of ISP liability, copyright protection, and human rights. In terms 
of interpretative authority, the focus will be mostly on the case law 
delivered by the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) and the European Court 
of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) which is equally binding to the majority of 
member states in the Council of Europe, however two courts do not bind 
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each other. This fact may create some disparities in interpretation of the 
same instruments, namely in interpretation of the ECHR. National 
judgments are used complementarily for descriptive purposes with the main 
analytical focus on international courts.  
From a structural point of view, the current thesis will start with identifying 
the existing rules on ISP general liability for online conduct (so-called ‘safe 
harbours’), as well as specifically for copyright and IP infringements based 
on attempted harmonisation of this area in EU, including the interpretation 
by the ECJ in this regard (Chapter 2). This chapter will address the 
shortcomings of outdated EU legislation and uncertainties therein in order to 
be successfully applicable to rapid technological changes.  
Chapter 3 of the current thesis will address the interrelationship between 
copyright and freedom of expression based on the ECHR and well-
developed case law of the ECtHR concerning freedom of speech on the 
internet, including the most evident ‘copyright versus freedom of 
expression’ case before the ECtHR, that is The Pirate Bay (‘TPB’) case. 
This chapter will inter alia address the application of principles developed 
by the ECtHR in order to limit the freedom of expression, including the tests 
of necessity and proportionality when assessing ISP conduct online.  
Finally, Chapter 4 will assert the possibility of introducing a new broader 
exception to copyright designed for ISP and based on public interest. First 
this chapter will identify the current state of law concerning exceptions to 
copyright in the EU, and then the possibility to either widen the scope of 
existing exceptions, or introduce a completely new one in order to include a 
wider range of ISP under ‘safe harbour’ principles, based on their 
importance in the age of information. 
 
1.7. Background 
 
An ISP is a company that provides a gateway to the internet which may 
include everything from enabling users to establish contact with the network 
to more particular services as e-mail, storage capacity, search engines, or 
auction sites etc.9 For the purposes of this thesis, an ISP is defined broadly: 
including not only connecting network providers, but also domain names 
and hosting service providers. Thus an ISP is defined as the provider of any 
kind of service on the internet, including social networks and peer-to-peer 
(‘P2P’) sharing platforms.  
Cultural industries that are most often threatened by the means and speed of 
modern dissemination of culture claim their significant economic loss due to 
                                                 
9 Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Freedom of Expression, Internet Responsibility, and Business 
Ethics: the Yahoo! Saga and Its Implications”, 106 Journal of Business Ethics (2012), 353–
365, 353.  
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the ‘blooming’ illegal online file sharing10, which includes books, music, 
films and software that are all protected under copyright.11 ‘War on piracy’ 
online has taken its toll in both technological, as well as legal measures. 
From the technological point of view, anti-circumvention provisions such as 
Digital Rights Management technologies that include access-restricting 
devices or technological protection measures (‘TPM’) have been used to 
restrict making of digital copy.12 From international legislation the most 
recent instrument on enforcement of IP rights in digital environment, 
involving ISP action, was the adoption of the controversial and highly 
debated Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (‘ACTA’) by the European 
Parliament in 2010, designed exclusively for enforcing IP rights online, and 
combatting infringements of copyright and related rights in the digital 
environment.13 ACTA inter alia requires ISP to disclose personal 
information sufficient to identify users who have infringed IP rights.14 
However, due to the unprecedented direct lobbying by thousands of EU 
citizens in street demonstrations, e-mails and calls to the offices of the 
European Parliament, as well as the petition signed by 2,8 million citizens 
worldwide, ACTA was rejected by the European Parliament in July 2012.15  
Legal measures have been also widely used against several ISP, including, 
for example, several disputes brought against popular torrent-file sharing 
website The Pirate Bay in several states, leading to the case against Sweden 
in the ECtHR.16 Legal cases were brought not only against mass storage 
websites or “cyberlockers” such as Megaupload, which was largely used for 
infringing downloads and was finally ordered to be shut down by the US 
Supreme Court17, but also against the preceding P2P software developers 
such as Grokster18 trying to held software developers liable for the copyright 
infringements. Video hosting website YouTube has not been overlooked 
either by copyright holders and their incentive to enforce their economic 
                                                 
10 Adrienne Muir, “Online Copyright Enforcement by Internet Service Providers”, 39 
Journal of Information Science (2012), 256–269, 258.  
11 Article 2(1) of Berne Convention which defines protected “literary and artistic works” as 
inter alia books, musical compositions with or without words, cinematographic works; and 
Article 10 (1) of TRIPS Agreement which states that computer programs, whether in source 
or object code, are protected as literary works under the Berne Convention.  
12 Marcella Favale, “The Right of Access in Digital Copyright: Right of the Owner or Right 
of the User?”, 15 The Journal of World Intellectual Property (2012), 1–25, 1.  
13 Preamble of Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, signed in Tokyo on 1 October 2011. 
14 Article 27 (4) of ACTA. 
15 European Parliament press release, “European Parliament rejects ACTA”, 4 July 2012. 
Available at: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20120703IPR48247/html/European-Parliament-rejects-ACTA>. Accessed 11 
May 2014. All subsequent sources accessed 11 May 2014.  
16 ECtHR, Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, 40397/12, Fifth Section, decision, 19 
February 2013. More on this case see further Chapter 3.3.2.  
17 Roger Parloff, “Megaupload and the Twilight of Copyright”, 166 Fortune (2012), 130–
140.  
18 United States Supreme Court, MGM Studios Inc v. Grokster Ltd, 545 U.S. 913 (2005), 27 
June 2005.  
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rights online: several judgements in Europe, including Spain19 and 
Germany20, have been made on the question of liability of YouTube for 
copyright infringements via its services.   
The confrontation of copyright holders and larger public has shown an 
interesting paradox: whilst cultural industries are eager to secure their broad 
monopolistic control over the cultural goods according to the ‘old’ rules of 
copyright protection, and desperately trying to restrict ‘copying’ and 
sharing, internet on the other hand is willing to live according to the new 
reality where IP rights enforcement mechanisms are rejected and TPM 
bypassed. As Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich has put, copyright laws have 
become the shield and the sword against the rest of the world, instead of 
remaining solely a defence against unfair competitors.21 
In this regard, ISP are left in dual position surrounded by two groups with 
clashing interests: the authors (or to be more precise: legitimate right 
holders) and the ‘end users’ of the cultural goods, who copy, upload and 
download, and share in the first place. Furthermore, it is remarkable that ISP 
have a role to play in this dual position, whereas ‘consumer’ as such is 
practically invisible in the law of European copyright, where the main actors 
are the content providers and the intermediaries, such as publishers, libraries 
and educational institutions.22 Furthermore, due to the mostly anonymous 
nature of the internet and in the light of ongoing debate on the “net 
neutrality” which concerns the question of how best to preserve the 
openness of internet23 and promotion of the interests of the citizens by 
promoting the ability of end users to access and distribute information24, the 
question of end users’ liability is even more controversial and problematic, 
than the question of ISP responsibility for copyright infringements, already 
due to the surveillance and privacy issues.25 France’s attempt to enforce 
anti-piracy law HADOPI by cutting down the internet access of repetitive 
suspects of piracy failed when French government decided to replace the 
system with increasing automatic fines to repetitive infringers instead of 
disconnection26 after the French Constitutional Council equated the access 
                                                 
19 Madrid Commercial Court, YouTube v. Telecinco, 289/2010, 23 September 2010. 
20 Hamburg District Court, GEMA v. YouTube, 310 0 461/10, 20 April 2012. 
21 Zeno-Zencovich, 353. 
22 Natali Helberger, Bernt Hugenholtz, “No Place Like Home for Making a Copy: Private 
Copying in European Copyright Law and Consumer Law”, 22 Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal (2007), 1061–1098, 1066. 
23 Supra note 2, COM(2011) 222. 
24 See for example Article 8(4)(g) of the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC) of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002. 
25 Pedro Pina, “Digital Copyright Enforcement: Between Piracy and Privacy” (Chapter 14) 
in Christina Akrivopolou, Athanasios-Efstratios Psygkas (eds), Personal Data Privacy and 
Protection in a Surveillance Era: Technologies and Practices (Hershey: Information 
Science Reference, 2011), 241–254. 
26 Siraj Datoo, “France Drops Controversial ‘Hadopi Law’ After Spending Millions”, The 
Guardian, 9 July 2013. Available at: 
<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/jul/09/france-hadopi-law-anti-piracy>  
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to the internet to the freedom of expression and communication, hence 
declared it to be a human right.27  
On the other hand, when ISP do actually benefit from the illegal content, it 
is quite problematic to state that an ISP should not bear any responsibility 
for any conduct of their services users.  
Economic advantages should not of course be an obstacle for enjoying the 
rights both businesses – copyright holders and ISP - are entitled to. 
However, morally stronger justifications are used by both sides, often in 
order to secure their business interests. That is, copyright is mostly relying 
on the protection of the author28, whilst ISP representatives highlight inter 
alia the possible negative impact on innovation if any “substantial 
modification of the liability regime” follows.29  
However, depending on the nature of its provided online services, an ISP 
could or should benefit from the exceptions deriving from as a beneficiary 
from the copyrighted material on the same ground as a major media 
publisher, notwithstanding the significant economic income that all of these 
intermediaries may acquire, based on a wider non-economic ‘value’ of such 
services and its impact on the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.  
The possible new changes to the existing body of law concerning copyright 
exceptions in Europe have already started by attempts to provide 
flexibilities concerning so-called user generated content (‘UGC’), such as 
remixes, mash-ups and other non-economic reuse of existing copyrighted 
works.30 Hence, these developments could imply that not only the 
enforcement of IP rights is in need of change, but the whole IP system in 
general.  
                                                 
27 French Constitutional Council, Decision 2009-580 DC, Act Furthering the diffusion and 
protection of creation on the Internet, 10 June 2009, para. 12. 
28 Trajce Cvetkovski, Copyright and popular media: liberal villains and technological 
change (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 69f.  
29 Nikki Tait, “EU Eyes Reform of Intellectual Property Laws”, Financial Times, 30 March 
2011. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/249be6f2-5ad9-11e0-8900-
00144feab49a.html> 
30 De Wolf and Partners, “Study on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society (the “InfoSoc Directive”)”, funded by the 
European Commission, 2013.  
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2. The liability of internet intermediaries for 
copyright infringements online 
2.1. General liability exemption 
 
The rules concerning ISP liability for copyright infringements in the 
European Union can be found mainly in the e-Commerce Directive31, the 
Info Soc Directive32, and the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement 
Directive (‘IPRED’)33.  
The e-Commerce Directive does not exclusively deal with IP issues, hence 
providing the general rules for ISP liability for the information transmitted 
via their services. According to Section 4 of the e-Commerce Directive 
(‘Liability of intermediary service providers’), an ISP is not responsible for 
the information transmitted via its services in three different scopes of 
circumstances: mere conduit services, caching, and hosting34, so called “safe 
harbour” principles. First two share the common exception of liability for 
mere technological automatic and intermediate transmission of information, 
where transmitted information is not modified by the provider. These 
exemptions from liability could mainly apply to the internet connection 
providers.  
 
2.1.1. Uncertainty regarding hosting service providers 
Hosting exemption on the other hand can be attributable for more specific 
service providers than mere internet connection providers. This exemption 
is based on the absence of knowledge by ISP of illegal activity or 
information stored, and requires certain actions such as removal or 
exclusion of the access to illegal content upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness.35  
However, recital 42 of the e-Commerce Directive states clearly that the 
exemptions of liability under this directive cover only the cases where the 
activity of ISP is limited to the technical process of operating and giving 
more efficient access to a communication network, thus covering the cases 
of mere automatic, technical and passive nature, which implies that the ISP 
                                                 
31 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), OJ L 178, 17 July 2000.  
32 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society, OJ L 167, 22 June 2001.  
33 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights, OJ L 157, 30 April 2004.  
34 E-Commerce Directive articles 12-15.  
35 E-Commerce Directive article 14.  
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has neither knowledge nor control over the transmitted or stored 
information. This recital has given some controversy in order to interpret 
‘hosting’ provider in the light of recent development and change of ISP 
variety on the market since the adoption of the e-Commerce Directive in 
2000.36  The fact that mere technical passive transmission exemption is 
highlighted in the separate provisions regarding both ‘mere conduit’ and 
‘caching’ being at the same time absent from the ‘hosting’ provision, would 
imply that recital 42 is only applicable to the former cases. The ECJ did 
state however that ‘hosting’ exemption does apply to the situations in which 
that provider has confined itself to a merely technical and automatic 
processing of data in a trademark related case L’Oreal v eBay.37 Yet the ECJ 
did place emphasis on the ‘actual knowledge’ that is required by the 
wording of the actual article, and the ‘active role’ of the operator when “it 
provides assistance which entails, /…/, optimising the presentation of the 
offers for sale in question or promoting them.”38 The question whether eBay 
did play such active role in promoting L’Oreal trademark infringing offers, 
the ECJ left to examine to national courts, but as pointed out by Béatrice 
Farano there exists a disparity between different national courts in Europe in 
granting ‘hosting’ provider exemption to certain ‘active’ service providers, 
such as inter alia MySpace, Google or eBay.39  
On the other hand, what comes to the copyright case of SABAM v. Netlog, 
the ECJ did not give any further consideration on the question of social 
network Netlog which provides users with the possibility to display personal 
photos and publish video clips on their globally available profile, being a 
hosting service provider within the meaning of Article 14 of the e-
Commerce Directive, simply stating that “it is not in dispute that the owner 
of an online social networking platform stores information provided by the 
users of that platform relating to their profile, on its servers, and that it is 
consequently a hosting service provider within the meaning of Article 14 of 
Directive 2000/31/EC”.40 
Additional criteria for falling under the e-Commerce Directive exemptions 
to liability is the evident (already from the title of the Directive) 
“commercial” nature of the services an ISP is providing. According to the 
Article 1(2) of the EU Directive on Technical Standards and Information 
Services 98/34/EC41, an ‘information society service’ is defined as “any 
                                                 
36 Béatrice Farano, “Internet Intermediaries’ Liability for Copyright and Trademark 
Infringement: Reconciling the EU and U.S. Approaches”, (TTLF Working Papers No. 14), 
Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum, 2012, 69f.  
37 ECJ, L’Oreal SA et al v. eBay International AG et al, C-324/09, Grand Chamber, 12 July 
2011. Para. 119. 
38 ibid, para. 116. 
39 Farano, 71–76.  
40 ECJ, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v 
Netlog NV, C-360/10, Third Chamber , judgment, 16 February 2012, para. 27.  
41 Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 
laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards 
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service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic 
means and at the individual request of a recipient of services”. Recital 18 of 
the e-Commerce Directive clarifies that (emphasis added) “information 
society services are not solely restricted to services giving rise to on-line 
contracting but also, in so far as they represent an economic activity, extend 
to services which are not remunerated by those who receive them, such as 
those offering on-line information or commercial communications, or those 
providing tools allowing for search, access and retrieval of data”. In this 
case, it is not surprising that a free social network such as Netlog is 
considered to be a hosting provider under the e-Commerce Directive, even 
though it is not receiving any payments for its services from end users. 
According to the same recital 18 of the e-Commerce Directive, search 
engines are not excluded from the scope of the e-Commerce Directive 
either.  
However, despite this explicit reference in the e-Commerce Directive itself, 
the economic or commercial nature of services provided by an ISP have 
been shown to be detrimental in order to benefit the ISP from the 
exemptions provided in Section 4, acknowledging the uncertainty of the e-
Commerce Directive in the light of growing diversity of hosting providers, 
without any actual clarifications made by the ECJ regarding the services not 
made for remuneration.  
In Google France v Luis Vuitton, Google’s referencing service AdWord 
system did fall under Article 14 of the Directive mainly because the criteria 
listed in Article 1(2) of the Directive 98/34/EC were met42, including the 
fact that AdWord was a paid system. Furthermore, the ECJ went further and 
clarified that “the mere facts that the referencing service is subject to 
payment, that Google sets the payment terms or that it provides general 
information to its clients cannot have the effect of depriving Google of the 
exemptions from liability provided for in Directive 2000/31.”43 The same 
rationale was reinstated in L’Oreal v eBay, where ECJ in addition held that 
‘active role’ of ISP goes beyond the mere provision of general 
information.44 
It would seem that by clarifying on the commercial nature of services which 
is not detrimental to the exemptions under the e-Commerce Directive per se, 
the ECJ did end the controversy concerning paid advertising space 
services45, however it did not do so in the case of ‘free’ service providers, 
including search engines. According to the opinion of Advocate General 
                                                                                                                            
and regulations,  OJ L 204, 21 July 1998. 
42 ECJ, Google France and Google v. Louis Vuitton, C-236/08, Grand Chamber, judgment, 
23 March 2010, para. 110.  
43 Google France v Louis Vuitton, para. 116. 
44 L’Oreal v eBay, para. 115. 
45 JF Bretonniere, “Liability for Internet Host Providers in the European Union: time for a 
reform?”, IAM Magazine (2011), 28–31, 30. Also Steven James, “L’Oreal and eBay & the 
Growing Accountability of e-Operators”, E-commerce law and policy (2011), 5–7, 7.  
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Jääskinen, the fact that the legal position of search engine service providers 
has not been expressly regulated in EU legislation and due to the fact that 
internet search engine providers like Google do not provide their service in 
return for remuneration from the internet users, search engine providers 
appear to fall outside the scope of application of the e-Commerce 
Directive.46  
Hence, due to this legal uncertainty, despite considering ‘free’ social 
network as a hosting provider under the e-Commerce Directive by the ECJ, 
and explicit reference to the search engines in recital 18 of the same 
directive, the scope of ‘hosting’ exemption is in need of further clarification, 
especially in the light of technological development of online service 
providers, when their ‘active’ and ‘passive’ role is no longer so cut clear 
whereas ‘mere technical, intermediate and automatic’ being strictly passive 
and thus exempted from liability as such.  
 
2.1.2. ‘Knowledge’ based exemption 
Despite a slightly confusing uncertainty concerning ‘hosting’ providers 
exemption alongside with recital 42 that concerns ‘mere technical, 
automatic and passive’ measure, the ECJ has taken a broader interpretation 
of this exemption in Google France v Louis Vuitton by stating that an ISP 
may benefit from the exemption as long as it has not played an active role of 
such kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over the data stored. 47 The 
ECJ did however link the active role of acquiring knowledge as opposed to 
the ‘neutral’ activity of ‘mere technical, automatic and passive’ nature.48 In 
other words, according to the ECJ, the necessary knowledge to be held 
liable for the information stored is lacking when the nature of service is 
merely technical, automatic and passive. This case was more in favour of 
Google as a search engine provider (and its AdWord system of sponsored 
links), when the ECJ stated that “/…/concordance between the keyword 
selected and the search term entered by an internet user is not sufficient of 
itself to justify the view that Google has knowledge of, or control over, the 
data entered into its system by advertisers and stored in memory on its 
server”.49  
The ECJ had another opportunity to clarify the ‘active role’ in the case of 
L’Oreal v eBay, where the ECJ reached a different conclusion on processing 
the data inserted by the users concerning the online marketplace eBay. The 
ECJ did acknowledge that eBay indeed stores the data entered by its 
customs-sellers, however this fact is not sufficient in itself to state whether 
                                                 
46 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in the case of ECJ, C-131/12, Google Spain v. 
AEPD, delivered on 25 June 2013, para. 37.  
47 Bretonniere, 29.  
48 Google France v Louis Vuitton, para. 114. 
49 ibid, para. 117.  
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eBay can be exempted from the liability.50 The active role which thus gives 
an ISP the necessary ‘knowledge’ to be held liable is the assistance intended 
to optimise or promote certain offers for sale.51 
The question is thus whether the knowledge of infringement is an actual 
knowledge of this infringement at all? And if ISP are not deprived of their 
rights to conduct business and profit from it, how come purely commercial 
interest in promotion of certain information can be used as exclusion from 
the exemptions of liability? On this part the ECJ does not give any further 
clarifications or guidelines.  
 
2.1.3. Acquiring knowledge of infringement and obligation to 
monitor  
In addition to these exemptions, the ISP provides no general obligation to 
monitor the information they store or transmit, nor a general obligation to 
actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity52, to the 
contrary of the wishes of certain right holders who advocate for stricter rules 
of conduct for ISP, e.g. implementation of filtering or monitoring 
technologies.  
However, according to Article 14(1)(b), the provider, upon obtaining 
knowledge or awareness of illegal activity, shall act expeditiously to remove 
or to disable access to the information. 
According to the ECJ, an ISP is denied the ability to rely on ‘safe harbour’ 
provisions, if it was actually aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of 
which a diligent economic operator should have identified the illegality, and 
such awareness may be acquired “as the result of an investigation 
undertaken on its own initiative/…/, as well as a situation in which the 
operator is notified of the existence of such an activity or such 
information”.53 
The problem of such ‘notice and take down’ system that has also been 
reinforced by the ECJ, is that it may place an extra heavy burden on more 
‘active’ ISP, whose services may account to more than mere technical, 
automatic and passive nature. It has been feared that trade mark and 
copyright owners are more likely to over notify the ISP for potential 
infringements which in the end will lead to a more large scale removal of 
content from its services in the fear of being held accountable for these 
infringements.54 
Furthermore, ISP should not become in any sense some sort of private 
censors discriminating the information circulating via their services. By 
                                                 
50 L’Oreal v eBay, para. 111.  
51 ibid, para. 114, 116. 
52 E-Commerce Directive article 15.  
53 L’Oreal v eBay, para. 122. 
54 James, 7.  
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giving such a distinctive ‘active role’ to the processing of data in order to 
held ISP liable for the infringements of the third parties, the ECJ is actually 
putting ISP to the ‘active’ position of evaluating the content that is stored on 
their services that goes beyond the mere technical, automatic and passive 
nature of ISP that is intended to benefit it from the safe harbour provisions 
under the e-Commerce Directive. Ironically enough, the ‘notice and take 
down’ system is encouraging ISP to acquire knowledge over the content, 
and thus if ISP are not acting in favour of right holders and do not restrict 
the access to the disputed content, the consequences of liability for ISP 
follow immediately as the necessary knowledge for being held liable is 
already acquired and data processed.  
Furthermore, “an investigation undertaken on its own initiative” that was 
mentioned by the ECJ in L’Oreal v eBay case is not only contradictory to 
the non-monitoring obligation under Article 15 of the e-Commerce 
Directive but also to the interpretation of the ECJ itself of the connection 
between hosting providers exemption with ‘neutrality’ of their services. 
Again, it seems that the ECJ is encouraging an ISP to overstep its ‘safe 
harbour’ of mere technical, automatic and passive nature without giving any 
guidance on the part of in which circumstances the ISP should initiate such 
independent investigation whilst there is no general obligation to actively 
seek illegal activity.  
While certainly being in place for securing the rights of right holders, this 
system is putting ISP in a slightly uncomfortable position, while not being 
in favour of freedom of expression and communication of the end users.  
 
2.2 Exemption from liability for copyright infringements 
 
The main regulation concerning copyright protection in the context of the 
internet is to be found in the Info Soc Directive 2001/29/EC which main 
purpose is to adapt legislation on copyright and related rights to reflect 
technological developments.55  
In the context of the internet, the main copyright holders’ rights that are 
mostly under ‘threat’ are the reproduction and distribution rights, as well as 
the right to make available to the public. The Info Soc Directive highlights 
the importance of proper support for the dissemination of culture, however 
stresses that this objective must not be achieved by sacrificing strict 
protection of rights or by tolerating illegal forms of distribution of pirated 
works.56 
                                                 
55 See information available at European Commission, “Copyright in the Information 
society”, Directives and Communications,  available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/copyright-infso/index_en.htm> 
56 Info Soc Directive, recital 22. 
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The Info Soc Directive is aimed at securing the implementation of the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty57 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty58, dealing respectively with the protection of authors and the 
performers and phonogram producers. These Treaties inter alia update the 
international protection for copyright and related rights with regard to the 
so-called “digital agenda” in order to improve the means to fight piracy 
world-wide.59 
In order to achieve the proper balance of rights and interests between 
different categories of right holders, the directive introduces a set of 
limitations in its Article 5. With regard to ISP, Article 5 (1)(a) provides that 
(emphasis added) temporary acts of reproduction, which are transient or 
incidental [and] an integral and essential part of a technological process 
and whose sole purpose is to enable a transmission in a network between 
third parties by an intermediary, or the lawful use of such a work, and which 
have no independent economic significance, shall be exempted from the 
exclusive reproduction right. Recital 33 clarifies that this exception includes 
acts which enable browsing, as well as acts of caching to take place, 
including those which enable transmission systems to function efficiently, 
provided that the intermediary does not modify the information and does not 
interfere with the lawful use of technology. Hence the Info Soc Directive 
follows the line taken in the e-Commerce Directive, where the acts of mere 
technical, automatic and passive nature are exempted from the liability. 
Also in order to be able to rely on this exception, the five conditions 
mentioned in the Article 5 (1)(a) have to be fulfilled cumulatively.60 
In addition to that, the Info Soc Directive sets a possibility for injunctions 
against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a 
copyright or related right in Article 8 (3) of the same directive. The 
possibility for injunctions was also reinforced in Article 11(3) of IPRED. 
 
2.2.1. Right to reproduction  
The rules of exception to copyright holders’ exclusive right to reproduction 
under the Info Soc Directive have been interpreted by the ECJ in Infopaq I61 
and Infopaq II62 cases. According to Article 2 (1)(a) of the Info Soc 
Directive, member states shall provide the authors of the work for the 
exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or 
                                                 
57 WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted on 20 December 1996, entered into force on 6 March 
2002. 
58 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted in 20 December 1996, entered into 
force on 20 May 2002. 
59 Info Soc Directive, recital 15.  
60 ECJ, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, (Infopaq II), C-302/10, 
Third Chamber, Order, 17 January 2012, para. 25. 
61 ECJ, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, (Infopaq I), C-5/08, 
Fourth Chamber, Judgment, 16 July 2009. 
62 See supra note 60. 
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permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part.  
Infopaq case concerned a media monitoring and analysis operator Infopaq 
whose business consisted primarily in drawing up summaries of Danish 
newspapers’ articles and sending those summaries to the customers by e-
mail. The ‘data capture’ process consisted of scanning the articles manually 
by the employees of Infopaq and then processing the image files into text 
files. In addition the extracts of 11 words from the articles were printed out 
and then transformed into a digital medium. The questions before the ECJ to 
answer in Infopaq II were whether these temporary acts of reproduction 
such as manual scanning and printing out, i.e. the involvement of the human 
intervention, can be an “integral and essential part of a technological 
process” that is exempted from the protection guaranteed in Article 2. The 
ECJ held that these acts do belong into integral and essential part of a 
technological process as this process could not function correctly and 
efficiently without these acts, as well as that these acts were not completed 
outside of technological process.63 The human involvement into the 
technological process is thus irrelevant.  
It could seem that exceptions provided in the Info Soc Directive might be 
slightly broader than the ones under the general e-Commerce Directive. The 
mere technical, automatic and passive nature of the acts conducted by 
intermediary is expanded to the possible human involvement into the 
technological process of the ‘data capture’, and still be considered as the 
part of an integral and essential technological process. However, in the case 
of Infopaq, the data monitoring service provider was not enabling the mere 
transmission of the protected work in a network, which would have been the 
classic example of ISP, but the technological process the Infopaq was 
conducting did fall under the lawful use of the work, i.e. the more efficient 
drafting of summaries of newspaper articles which in itself as a purpose is 
not restricted by the EU or Danish legislation.64 Hence, the ECJ did not 
consider the reproduction of the works being the act independent from the 
initial purpose of the process, i.e. making the summaries of the articles.  
Due to the specifics of the case, the more general exception concerning the 
hosting providers as for example P2P platforms, trackers etc, whose services 
are used to perform the acts that are exclusively granted to the copyright 
holders, might not be considered as a lawful use of the work, because they 
might be performed without the authorisation of the copyright holder. The 
performance of the services can thus fall under the enabling transmission in 
a network between third parties by an intermediary if the other conditions 
set in Article 5(1)(a) are cumulatively fulfilled.  
In the case of hosting providers, however, the condition “temporary” copy 
might become tricky in order to fall under the exception provided in Article 
5(1). The so-called term “upstream” reproduction which is the copy being 
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64 Infopaq II, para. 44. 
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available at users’ demand on the hosting server is most likely a permanent 
one, which is excluded from the exception provided in Article 5 (1).65 
Hence the scope of exceptions concerning hosting providers under the Info 
Soc Directive is limited and quite restricted.  
 
2.2.2. Communication to the public 
According to Article 3 (1) of the Info Soc Directive, the authors are 
provided with the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, 
including the making available to the public of their works in such a way 
that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. The Info Soc Directive sets an exhaustive list 
of exceptions for this right in its Article 5(3).66 These exceptions do not 
include ISP in the same way as Article 5(1), and apply, for example, for the 
purpose of teaching and scientific research, for the use by people with 
disabilities, or making available of published articles on current economic, 
political or religious topics to the extent justified by the informatory 
purpose, etc.  
In the light of ISP, the right of making available to the public is relevant in 
the context of ‘streaming’ media, a popular technology for enabling 
consumers to access audio and video content over the internet. Streaming is 
usually contrasted with downloading, the latter being the storage of the copy 
of the work on the users’ hard drive, and thus with possibility to further 
distribute such copy, while streaming does not leave any trace on the user’s 
computer.67   
Consequently, by allowing streaming services, an ISP may be held liable for 
infringing copyright holder’s right to communicate their works to the public, 
if the work placed on the server is unauthorised. However, with the respect 
of uploaded video by a third party on the host server, the question of ISP 
liability would be rather assessed under the rules of the e-Commerce 
Directive, than under exceptions provided in the Info Soc Directive which 
deals with the direct use of copyrighted material. ISP on the other hand are 
rather the enhancers than users of such material.68 
However, in the case of clickable links or ‘hyperlinks’ provided by ISP, that 
could also be relevant to the search engines, the ECJ was asked to rule on 
the question whether the supply of clickable internet links by anyone else 
                                                 
65 De Wolf and Partners, 119.  
66 See recital 32 of Info Soc Directive: “This Directive provides for an exhaustive 
enumeration of exceptions and limitations to the reproduction right and the right of 
communication to the public.”  
67 Simon Stokes, Digital Copyright: Law and Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd, 2014), 
177. 
68 Nenad Gavrilovic, “Using YoutTube: Practical Consequences of the Approach Adopted 
by EU Copyright Law”, 18 Journal of Intellectual Property Rights (2013), 556–565, 560.  
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than a copyright holder does constitute communication to the public within 
the meaning of Article 3 (1) of the Info Soc Directive in the case of 
Svensson v Retriever Sverige AB.69 According to the ECJ, the provision of 
clickable links to protected works must be considered to be ‘making 
available’ and an ‘act of communication’. The term ‘public’ was also 
confirmed as that provision requires an ‘indeterminate number of potential 
recipients and implies a fairly large number of persons.70 However, in 
Svensson case, the authorisation by the copyright holders in order to provide 
the hyperlinks to the already widely accessible protected works was not 
required, as the communication to the public by Retriever Sverige was not 
made to a ‘new public’.71 Infringing act is therefore when a clickable link 
constitutes an intervention to the restricted access to the protected work and 
therefore transmits the work to the ‘new’ users who were not taken into 
account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial 
communication.72  
Hence merely facilitating the access to the already published and freely 
accessed protected works does not constitute a copyright infringement, even 
if the role of an ISP is more than merely facilitating the transmission in the 
network and is closer to the actual use of these works. 
However, what comes to terrestrial television broadcast through a website 
streaming service, then according to the ECJ in ITV Broadcasting Ltd v TV 
Catchup Ltd73 case, such streaming service provided by a different service 
provider than the original broadcaster is to be considered a new 
communication to the public that requires an authorisation from the right 
holder, despite the fact that de facto there is no new public involved, as the 
people who can access the disputed live stream through the website have to 
be residents of the state in which territory the broadcast is available and 
claim to hold the relevant license in order to access the same broadcast on a 
television receiver. In this sense, the ECJ had clearly stated that streaming is 
a copyright infringing activity74, even if the works protected are already 
published and accessible by other technical means.  
 
2.2.3. Injunctions against intermediaries 
However, the exceptions provided in the Info Soc Directive do not take into 
consideration the liability of ISP as they are not in general perceived to be 
                                                 
69 ECJ, Nils Svensson, Sten Sjögren, Madelaine Sahlman, Pia Gadd v. Retriver Sverige AB, 
C-466/12,  Fourth Chamber, judgment, 13 February 2014.  
70 Svensson, para. 20–21. 
71 Svensson, para. 30. 
72 Svensson, para. 31.  
73 ECJ, ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TV Catchup Ltd, C-607/11, Fourth Chamber, 
judgment, 7 March 2013.  
74 Jeremy De Beer, Mira Burri, “Transatlantic Copyright Comparisons: Making Available 
via Hyperlinks in the European Union and Canada”, 36 European Intellectual Property 
Review (2014), 95–105, 103.  
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the main users of copyrighted material and hence cannot generally rely on 
the existing list of exceptions and limitations to the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders under Article 5(3) of the Directive.  
The only explicit mentioning of ‘intermediary’ is concerning the 
aforementioned limitation to the right to reproduction, as well as the 
possibility for injunctions from the copyright holders against intermediary 
who carries a third party’s infringement of a protected work. According to 
recital 59 of the Info Soc Directive, intermediaries are best placed to bring 
copyright infringing activities in the digital environment to an end. 
Furthermore, such injunctions should be available even where the acts 
carried out by the intermediary are exempted under Article 5.  
The possibility for injunctions is closely linked to the prohibition to monitor 
under the e-Commerce Directive. The injunction brought against an ISP 
which provides its customers solely with the internet access without offering 
any other services, lead to the case of Scarlet v SABAM75 before the ECJ. In 
this case SABAM, a management company representing authors and other 
copyright holders, sought an order requiring the internet access provider 
Scarlet to bring illegal downloading via P2P networks to an end by 
blocking, or making it impossible for its customers to receive the files 
containing an unauthorised musical work using P2P software. Scarlet inter 
alia claimed that this injunction is contrary to Article 15 of the e-Commerce 
Directive as it imposes de facto a general obligation to monitor 
communications on its network. Belgian court of appeal referred a question 
to the ECJ and asked whether the national courts may issue an injunction 
against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a 
copyright, to order an ISP to install a system of filtering all electronic 
communications. The answer of the ECJ was ‘no’, despite its previous 
judgment in L’Oreal v eBay where the ECJ did acknowledge that measures 
against intermediaries must be allowed in order to prevent further 
infringements.76 The ECJ did heavily rely on the economic rationale behind 
such wide injunction to monitor all the electronic communications made 
through the network, without any limitation in time, directed to all future 
infringements of not only existing works, but also future works that have not 
yet been created. Such broad injunction according to the ECJ is first of all a 
serious infringement of the freedom of an ISP to conduct its business since 
it would require the ISP to install a complicated, costly and permanent 
system at its own expense.77 This judgment has been definitely perceived as 
a win of ISP78, especially after following judgment in SABAM v Netlog, 
                                                 
75 ECJ, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auters, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL 
(SABAM), C-70/10, Third Chamber, judgment, 24 November 2011.   
76 L’Oreal v eBay, para. 131. 
77 Scarlet v SABAM, para. 47–48. 
78 Evangelia Psychogiopoulou, “(Case Comment) Copyright Enforcement, Human Rights 
Protection and the Responsibilities of Internet Service Providers After Scarlet”, 38 
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where the ECJ applied the same reasoning with regard to hosting provider 
of social network services against an injunction to block the exchange of 
copyright infringing files on the users’ online profile79, however, it is worth 
mentioning that SABAM cases did not rule out the possibility of ‘blocking’ 
injunctions against ISP that could be sponsored between ISP and the right 
holders, or could be temporary.80 Another uncertainty is the possibility to 
order an injunction to block only one website, which is no doubt a lot 
narrower injunction that the ones outlawed in SABAM cases.81 Especially 
when the rules of the ‘notice and take down’ system are not only absent 
from the EU regulations that are supposed to harmonise the copyright law 
between the member states, but also explicitly left for the member states to 
decide upon82, including the conditions and modalities relating to the 
injunctions.83  
The absence of clear guidelines from the ECJ does not make it easier for the 
member states to decide upon these rules either, in particular regarding the 
absence of clear term of ‘acquiring knowledge’ and when such knowledge 
will ship an ISP from its safe harbour, including the uncertainty between 
prohibition of monitoring and the rules for injunctions of blocking the 
content online.  
While emphasising the economic impact on ISP by not allowing such broad 
blocking injunctions, the ECJ completely overlooks the arguments deriving 
from the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of users. In both 
SABAM cases, the referring courts did question the interpretation of the 
provisions set in the directives in the light of Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR. 
The ECJ briefly touched upon the equivalent rights situated in the EU 
Charter instead and referred to its own case-law, stating that fundamental 
right to property, which includes the rights linked to intellectual property, 
must be balanced against the protection of other fundamental rights.84 
Furthermore, when addressing the issue with freedom of information, the 
ECJ used cautious language85 by holding that the injunction in question 
could potentially undermine freedom of information since that system might 
not distinguish adequately between unlawful and lawful content.86 The right 
                                                 
79 See SABAM v Netlog, supra note 40.  
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81 ibid. 
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to privacy did not require even that much of attention.87 
The aching issue of balance between fundamental rights and the injunctions 
to block the website with infringing content was finally addressed before the 
ECJ in UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film and Wega.88 The case concerned 
the injunction against an ISP who provides the internet access to block a 
website which provided the users with a possibility to both download and 
stream cinematographic works without the right holders’ authorisation. The 
national court decided to refer inter alia the question before the ECJ, 
concerning whether it is compatible with the EU law, in particular with the 
necessary balance between the parties’ fundamental rights, to prohibit in 
general terms an ISP from allowing its customers access to a certain website 
as long as the material available on that website is provided exclusively or 
predominantly without the right holder’s consent.  
First, the ECJ highlighted the existing conflict of interests in the case of 
such injunction, and stated that all interests at stake, that is i) copyrights and 
related rights concerning cinematographic works; ii) the freedom of ISP to 
conduct a business; and iii) the freedom of information of internet users are 
protected under the EU Charter, hence all of these interests are protected as 
fundamental rights.89 Then the ECJ stated that the injunction that does not 
impose an ISP to imply any unnecessary costly specific measures does only 
restrict the freedom to conduct its business, but does not seem to infringe 
the very substance of such freedom, as the ISP is free to choose the 
measures which are best adapted to the resources and abilities available to 
him.90 Lastly, the ECJ explicitly held that blocking a website with infringing 
content “allows its addressee [ISP] to avoid liability by proving that he has 
taken all reasonable measures”.91 By being so firm in relation to the liability 
and actions expected to be taken by ISP, the ECJ goes further by obliging an 
ISP to ensure compliance with the fundamental freedoms of internet users 
when choosing the measures for achieving the purpose of the injunction.92 
And lastly the ECJ ‘kills’ any possibility to use freedom of expression 
arguments in order to not block the website with infringing content, by 
stating that (emphasis added) “the fundamental rights recognised by the EU 
law must be interpreted as not precluding a court injunction prohibiting an 
internet service provider from allowing its customers access to a website 
placing protected subject-matter online without the agreement of the 
rightholders when that injunction does not specify the measures which that 
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access provider must take /…/, provided that (i) the measures taken do not 
unnecessarily deprive internet users of the possibility of lawfully accessing 
the information available and (ii) that those measures have the effect of 
preventing unauthorised access to the protected subject-matter or, at least, of 
making it difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users 
who are using the services of the addressee of that injunction from accessing 
the subject-matter that has been made available to them in breach of the 
intellectual property right.”93 It is difficult to come up with any other 
measure than blocking the access to the website with infringing material 
which would prevent access to the protected works, especially from the 
standpoint of mere internet access providers who do not have any other 
control over the content on such websites.  
UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film and Wega case shows clearly the priority 
the ECJ is placing on the protection of copyright holders, and the extremely 
difficult position it imposes on ISP, whose only option to avoid the liability 
for copyright infringements is to block the access to the contested website. 
The obligation to secure the fundamental right of users seems not only 
burdensome to the private company as ISP who in some way have to take 
the stand of the public authority, but also quite vague, as first it is not the 
primary concern of private business to evaluate the best means to ensure the 
freedom of expression of its customers, and second the internet users are left 
to assert their fundamental rights before the courts once the ISP have 
already taken the implementing measures.94 Hence the judicial review of the 
blocking measures is only available after the access to the content is blocked 
and the rights of copyright holders secured.  Consequently, it implies that 
copyright is taking precedence over the right to information, according to 
the ECJ.  
 
2.3. Concluding remarks 
 
While definitely harmonising the overbroad protection of copyright holders, 
both the e-Commerce and the Info Soc directives, as well as their 
interpretation by the ECJ do not properly address the issue of ISP 
responsibility. Rules of the e-Commerce Directive are unclear with regard to 
hosting providers and more ‘active’ ISP whose role in conducting the 
services is falling outside of mere technical scope. The uncertainty in 
interpretation of an ISP is in place as it is still unclear whether search 
engines can be exempted from liability as their services are non-
commercial. The rules (or the absence of clear guidelines, to be more 
precise) of acquiring knowledge and their interpretation by the ECJ of 
infringement are shown to be in conflict with the general prohibition to 
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monitor illegal activity conducted via services provided by ISP. In this 
regard, the ECJ relies on the term of diligent provider who is encouraged to 
take its own initiative and step outside of its passive role in order to 
primarily secure the rights of copyright holders, at the expense of the 
freedom to seek and impart information by the end users. Hence, indirect 
monitoring is not only allowed according to the ECJ, it is even favoured, 
leaving ISP no other choice as to react immediately to the claims of 
copyright holders in order to not be held liable for any possible copyright 
infringement. 
The Info Soc Directive does not bring any relief to the ISP either. First of 
all, the exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright holders are designed 
to benefit the users of the protected works and not the mere facilitators of 
the use of such works. In regard to ISP, who are mostly enhancers of such 
use, application of the Info Soc Directive is rather limited and restricted, 
concerning only the right to reproduction if the copy stored is temporary and 
constitutes a lawful use of the work. The conduct of third parties who might 
infringe the exclusive rights of copyright holders via the services proved by 
ISP is regulated through unregulated right to injunctions against 
intermediaries. The ECJ is definitely favouring the blocking injunctions 
while mostly overlooking any arguments deriving from human rights such 
measures are directly affecting. After all, the blocking of a website is cutting 
of any seeking or imparting of any information possible. Furthermore, the 
ECJ is explicitly excluding human rights arguments from the debate if the 
restriction to the rights of copyright holders is at stake. At the same time the 
ECJ is placing a burden of balancing different interests, including the proper 
way to secure the fundamental rights of its end users, to the ISP. Leaving 
the decision making over fundamental rights and freedoms to the private 
sector is not necessarily the best way to secure the proper protection of 
human rights.  
Instead of placing wider burden on ISP in order to frantically secure the 
interests of copyright holders, the system of ISP liability should be 
reconceptualised in order to focus on striking the proper balance between 
the rights of copyright holders and the wider public represented by the end 
users. As has been showed previously, the scale seems to be more heavily in 
favour of the copyright holders, while as expressed by several 
commentators, being against users’ human rights, e.g. freedom of 
expression.95  
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3. Interrelationship between copyright and 
freedom of expression  
3.1. Freedom of expression online 
 
According to Article 10 (1) of the ECHR, everyone has the right to freedom 
of expression. This right includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. However, this right is not absolute and according 
to the paragraph 2 of the same article, the exercise of these freedoms, since 
it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
The notion of enjoying the freedom ‘regardless of frontiers’ can imply that 
individuals in modern times and in the light of technological development 
must be able to express themselves, as well as seek and impart information 
online as much as offline. This principle of protection of freedom of 
expression on the internet has been inter alia acknowledged both by the 
Human Rights Council (‘HRC’) in its Resolution of 29 June 2012 where the 
HRC affirmed that the freedom of expression must be protected online 
regardless of the choice of the one’s media96, and the Council of Europe 
who provided that the right to freedom of expression applies to both online 
and offline activities, regardless of frontiers in the Recommendation of the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on the protection and promotion 
of the universality, integrity, and openness of the Internet.97  
According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(‘OHCHR’), a human rights approach views information and 
communication technologies not only as a means of exchanging and 
disseminating information, but as a tool to improve the enjoyment of human 
rights such as inter alia freedom of expression.98  
Furthermore, there is nothing in the wording of Article 19 of the 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)99 either to 
exclude the protection of freedom of expression online. According to Article 
19 (2) of the ICCPR the right to freedom of expression includes freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through 
any other media of his choice. 
Due to the fact that the right is construed in general terms regarding the 
choice of media, the wording of Article 19(2) is flexible enough to support 
claims that internet is the appropriate medium to benefit from the protection 
under ICCPR.100 However, it is noteworthy to bear in mind that human 
rights after all protect humans, not technology.101  
Regarding this in the light of equal protection of freedom of expression both 
off and online, ISP not only play an important role in ensuring the 
enjoyment of the freedom of expression, but they also need to benefit from 
such significant position in the information society. Yes, duties and 
responsibilities mentioned in Article 10 (2) of the ECHR are attributable to 
ISP, however these duties cannot exist without the enjoyment of actual right 
to freedom of expression, i.e. there is no second paragraph without the first 
one.  
 
3.2. The relationship between two Europes: ECJ and 
ECtHR 
 
In the light of the ‘need’ to secure copyright holders’ rights online by 
combatting the piracy and cleansing the internet from illegal content, both e-
Commerce and Info Soc directives do have an objective to comply with the 
fundamental principles of law, especially freedom of expression and the 
public interest.  Furthermore, one of the objectives of the e-Commerce 
Directive is to ensure the free movement of information society services 
which according to the preamble of the e-Commerce Directive is the 
specific reflection of freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 10 (1) of 
ECHR.  The explicit mentioning of Article 10 could thus imply that there is 
no need to seek for additional external reasons to invoke the reasoning 
deriving from the freedom of expression, as it is explicitly evident directly 
from the text of the directives.  
Furthermore, the rights enshrined in the ECHR are considered to be the 
general principles of the EU law that have a higher status in the European 
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hierarchy of norms and directives. The ECHR can thus be considered the 
highest binding source of law within the EC concerning fundamental rights, 
so that both primary and secondary EC law must be in compliance with the 
ECHR.102 The EU acceded to the ECHR with the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty103 in 2009 and has included the EU Charter as a foundation of the 
European Union with the same legal value as the Treaties of EU.104 
Secondly, the freedom of expression is enshrined in the instrument of the 
EU own legislation, i.e. Article 11 (1) of the EU Charter: “Everyone has the 
right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”. While asserting 
the balance between different right holders, including the fundamental rights 
of end users, the ECJ is referring to the EU Charter instead of the ECHR, as 
well as referring to its own case law while explicitly being asked to rule on 
the issues in the light of the ECHR.  
As has been shown and discussed in the previous chapter (‘Chapter 2’), the 
ECJ takes the arguments deriving from freedom of expression rather 
secondary, simply stating that the balance between the competing interests 
should be properly made, however, the ECJ is clearly prioritising economic 
interests of copyright holders when balancing such interests with the 
fundamental rights of users.  
The ECJ is not only reluctant to take any substantial stand on the 
interpretation of the relationship between securing the trade and economic 
interests of copyright holders on one hand, and the fundamental freedom of 
expression and information on the other, by using cautious language and 
only reinstating the general principles, but also even if the court eventually 
does take a stand, the protection of freedom of expression of the users seems 
not to be the first concern. This fact makes the whole need for proper 
balance declaratory and rhetoric.  
The protection of fundamental rights may not be given the weight it 
deserves in the terms of reasoning and in terms of the possible outcome, 
when these arguments are seen as just one argument out of many, or clearly 
stepping aside before the economic interests of copyright holders.  
Based on the prevailing nature of the right to freedom of expression being 
the fundamental right and the basis for democratic society, it is important to 
bear in mind that this overarching principle should not only be taken into 
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consideration when balancing different interests, but should also be capable 
of limiting the far reaching overprotective nature of European copyright 
protection, as in the ECJ’s own words “there is nothing whatsoever in the 
wording of Article 17(2) of the Charter to suggest that the right to 
intellectual property is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely 
protected.”   
In this sense there is no possible explanation why the right to property is or 
should be more protected than the other fundamental rights and freedoms, 
including the right to seek and impart information. The ECHR and the 
relevant case law of the ECtHR must be taken into account in order to find 
the proper balance between two fundamental principles.  
 
3.3. Copyright and freedom of expression under ECHR 
 
As much as the protection of intellectual property is violable and subject to 
exceptions and limitations, the same could be said about the protection of 
freedom of expression which could be subject to the limitations as well. The 
term ‘right of others’, situated in Article 10 (2) of the ECHR, certainly 
includes a range of subjective rights protected by copyright that could limit 
the freedom of expression.105  
Furthermore, even though there is no explicit mentioning of intellectual 
property in the text of the ECHR, the ECtHR has invoked intellectual 
property rights protection through right to property under Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. The ECtHR stated in numerous cases that 
intellectual property is protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in regard to 
both natural106 and legal persons107. Already in 1997, the European 
Commission of Human Rights held that in principle copyright protection 
constitutes a significant limitation to freedom of speech. However, 
copyright protection can lawfully restrict freedom of speech as long as it 
complies with the requirements of Article 10 (2).108 
According to the case law of the ECtHR, the limitations to Article 10 (2) are 
justified when these restrictions are i) prescribed by law, ii) pursue one of 
the legitimate aims codified in Article 10 (2), which in the case of copyright 
might be argued to be the protection of the rights of others, and iii) are 
necessary in the democratic society. The notion of ‘necessary in democratic 
society’ is in turn divided into two conditions that have to be fulfilled: the 
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restrictive measure has to meet the condition of i) existing ‘pressing social 
need’; and ii) it has to be ‘proportionate to the aim pursued’.109 
Hence any interference with the internet users’ freedom of expression has to 
be conducted by the rules established by the ECtHR. The fact that the 
protection of intellectual property is considered to be a human right does not 
automatically make it a justified restriction to the freedom of expression per 
se. 
In the case of ISP, a progressive reading of the case law of the ECtHR 
concerning Article 10 should logically imply the importance of technical 
intermediaries for the enjoyment and the protection of freedom of 
expression.110 Furthermore, the ECtHR has emphasised with regard to the 
publishers that in supplying authors with a medium, they participate fully in 
freedom of expression and thus enjoy the guarantees offered by Article 
10.111 By analogy, protecting ISP is therefore protecting freedom of 
expression.112 
In the light of the fact that the guarantees set in Article 10, that is the 
freedom to receive information, do not extend only to the matters of public 
concern, but cover in principle also cultural expressions and pure 
entertainment113, as well as commercial speech is also protected under 
Article 10114, it is sufficient to state that in principle the ISP providing 
access to such information, whether it concerns political debate or 
commercial information, should be protected under Article 10.   
Furthermore, the ECHR protects the transmission of information as much as 
its content “since any restriction imposed on the means necessarily 
interferes with the right to receive and impart information”.115 The 
protection under Article 10 also applies to corporate profit-making 
bodies116, thus to the legal persons, and is applicable to so called 
‘commercial speech’, as for example advertising117. In addition the Article 
10 is protecting the matters with no public interest in the first place.118 
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Deriving from the principles developed by the ECtHR, there is no basis to 
deny ISP the protection granted from the Article 10, even if the matters of 
political debate and speech are absent from the services provided by ISP 
which have been given a certain ‘special’ protection in the ECtHR.119 
Indeed, the threshold for protecting political speech is lower than in the 
matters of other interests, however this does not imply that ‘other’ kind of 
speech is not worth protection. 
Even if there is no direct right to entertainment, as argued by Vincenzo 
Zeno-Zencovich120, the closer look to case law of the ECtHR reveals the 
opposite view: the access to entertainment may be in public interest and thus 
covered by the protection of the right to seek and impart information. And 
this principle could be especially crucial with regard to injunctions ordered 
to ISP in order to block the access to particular websites.  
 
3.3.1. Blocking measures 
Yildirim v. Turkey121 case concerned not copyright infringement but the 
assault of the memory of Atatürk instead. The applicant published his works 
and opinions on his website hosted by Google sites. Due to the criminal 
proceedings against the third party who allegedly assaulted the memory of 
Atatürk via Google sites services, the injunction against the ISP got ordered. 
According to that order, the ISP blocked the access to all Google sites 
whatsoever, including to the non-infringing website of the applicant. 
First of all, the ECtHR stated that “whatever its legal basis, such a measure 
[the injunction to block Google sites] was bound to have an influence on the 
accessibility of the Internet and, accordingly, engaged the responsibility of 
the respondent State under Article 10”.122 Hence no matter what is the law 
behind such measure, the blocking of access to the website is considered to 
be an interference with the enjoyment of the freedom of expression and 
should be assessed under the principles of Article 10 (2). Basically, there is 
nothing to deny the analogy of that case to the circumstances where the 
legal basis for injunctions is a possible infringement of copyright.  
The ECtHR proceeded with the test of ‘prescribed by law’ in which the 
notion of ‘law’ according to the court’s well established jurisprudence has to 
be “accessible to the person concerned, who must moreover be able to 
foresee its consequences, and that it should be compatible with the rule of 
law”.123 ‘Foreseeablity criteria’ means that the rule has to be formulated 
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with sufficient precision to enable any individual to regulate his conduct.124 
The national basis for the injunction did not specify the rules of blocking the 
wholesale access to Google sites which legality was not in the question. The 
judicial proceedings concerned the publications made by the third party and 
did not concern the legality of Google sites nor the whole website 
maintained by the applicant. Nor was there indicated that Google sites were 
properly notified of the infringing content, or refused to comply with an 
interim measure concerning the infringing website in question that could 
have raised the issue of liability of Google sites under the rules of Turkish 
law.125 
Furthermore, according to the court’s reasoning Turkish law “conferred 
extensive powers on an administrative body [the ISP who blocked the 
access] in the implementation of a blocking order originally issued in 
relation to a specified site.”126 The ECtHR stated that such measures applied 
by ISP have to be based on a legal framework which ensures both tight 
control over the scope of bans and effective judicial review to prevent any 
abuse of power. The court stressed that “the judicial review of such a 
measure, based on a weighing-up of the competing interests at stake and 
designed to strike a balance between them, is inconceivable without a 
framework establishing precise and specific rules regarding the application 
of preventive restrictions on freedom of expression.”127 The proper 
weighing up of the various interests at stake is inescapable, as such 
obligation flows directly from the Convention. Furthermore, such restriction 
on the rights of the users had a significant collateral effect128, and produced 
arbitrary effects.129 In addition, the court held that the judicial-review 
procedures concerning the blocking of internet sites were insufficient to 
meet the criteria for avoiding abuse, as domestic law did not provide for any 
safeguards to ensure that a blocking order in respect of a specific site is not 
used as a means of blocking access in general.130 Consequently, the ECtHR 
found a violation of Article 10.  
First of all it is noteworthy to comment that according to this reasoning of 
the court, the wholesale blocking of access to any kind of hosting services 
might rarely be justified, as such blanket ban is already against the rule of 
law before even entering the test of necessity in democratic society and 
proportionality. What comes to often perceived as completely illegal P2P 
platforms, torrent trackers and other file-sharing websites, then it is scarcely 
the case when the whole resources of such host provider are used for hosting 
only infringing material. Hence, the rights of law-obeying internet users, 
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and the possible significant collateral effect of blocking measures, have to 
be weighed against the interests of economic loss of copyright holders.  
The second issue concerns the rules for injunctions ordered to ISP and ISP’s 
discretion in choosing the ‘proper’ measure in order to find the needed 
balance between the competing interests. As highlighted by the ECtHR in 
Yildirim, a legal framework of clear rules and guidelines is needed regarding 
the application of preventive restrictions on freedom of expression. These 
rules are directly connected to the ISP liability rules established by the e-
Commerce and Info Soc directives which grant national courts the power of 
injunction against intermediary in order to terminate and prevent the 
infringement. As stated earlier, the rules of ISP liability do not adequately 
take into consideration the concerns of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
This view was also inter alia acknowledged in the concurring opinion of 
judge Pinto de Albuquerque131 in Yildirim, who also provided his view on 
this point, i.e. the minimum criteria for the ECHR-compatible legislation on 
internet blocking. These criteria according to the judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque have to include inter alia the observance of the criterions 
developed by the case law of the ECtHR, i.e. the criterion of proportionality 
which provides the fair balance between the respect of minimum core of 
freedom of expression and the competing interests pursued, according to the 
Article 10 (2); and the criterion of necessity that goes no further than 
meeting the necessary ‘social need’.  
While ‘pressing social need’ to block the access to the infringing content 
might be justified by the need to combat the piracy or further dissemination 
of the illegal material, the trickiest criteria for the right holders to extend 
their interests to the blocking the access to information, is the 
‘proportionality criterion’. According to the ECtHR, the proportionality test 
goes hand in hand with the test of ‘adequacy’ which includes the assessment 
whether the measures taken are ‘relevant and sufficient’ to justify the 
legitimate aim pursued.132 In addition, the restrictive measure has to be both 
rationally connected to its end and suitable for leading to this end.133 
Blocking the access is not only ineffective in order to stop the infringement, 
it is definitely not sufficient in order to protect the exclusive right of 
copyright holders. Illegal content endlessly returns to the web from one 
blocked website to another: it is common that after the closure of one 
website, illegal material is transferred to another address.134 Furthermore, 
legal actions by means of blocking against unauthorised file sharing often 
has only an immediate effect which typically lasts for six months, as illegal 
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supply and demand find other places to meet.135 Bearing in mind the general 
prohibition of monitoring the traffic by ISP under the e-Commerce 
Directive, it is impossible to demand from ISP to follow and track the 
further transfer of infringing material. Hence the blocking of the whole 
website would not give any plausible efficient relief for the right holders, at 
the same time damaging the enjoyment of freedom of expression by both 
hosting providers and end users. In result the issue of over-blocking arises, 
as expressed by Adrienne Muir, constituting a “use of hammer to crack a 
nut”,136 when legal activity is impeded by the desperate attempt to conquer 
the illegal file sharing.  
The other minimum criteria for injunctions of blocking for ISP to be 
compatible with the ECHR that were expressed by the judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque, were the clear definitions of  the “categories of persons and 
institutions to have their publications blocked”, and the “categories of 
blocking orders”. In both definitions the judge Pinto de Albuquerque was 
advocating for including the specific mentioning of different hosting 
providers: e.g. “websites”, “platforms”, “IP addresses”, “social networks”, 
“ports” etc. As there is definitely a need for ‘specifying’ the rules for ISP 
liability, this need does not include specifying the different types of 
technology that could be liable for any kind of infringements. Due to the 
unpredicted and rapid change of technology, especially considering the 
nature of the internet, the terms concerning such technology have to remain 
as general as possible in order to include the widest range of ISP.  
Another important aspect that was established by Yldirim case and 
highlighted by the judge Pinto de Albuquerque is the proper judicial review 
of every possible restriction on the freedom of expression. The avoidance of 
‘private censorship’ and arbitrary abuse of fundamental rights can mostly be 
achieved by a proper judicial review that is not only post but also prior to 
the measures taken. Judge Pinto de Albuquerque expressed the need for 
clear rules of (emphasis added) “a procedure to be followed for the issuance 
of that [blocking] order, which includes the examination by the competent 
authority of the case file supporting the request for a blocking order and the 
hearing of evidence from the affected person or institution.” It is definitely a 
point that is completely absent from the perspective of the ECJ concerning 
the blocking injunctions and their relationship with freedom of expression in 
the case of UPC Telekabel v Constantin Film and Wega, where the ECJ 
acknowledged only the need for the possibility to appeal the injunctions by 
the affected users137, but no procedure regarding the implication of the 
blocking measures. The importance of safeguarding the presumption of 
innocence and the defence of the accused is completely overlooked by such 
interpretation by the ECJ.  
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Two European courts however agree on the point of proper judicial 
safeguards regarding already imposed blocking measures for the affected 
internet users after the ISP has taken the measures. 
According to Article 1(3) of the Framework Directive138 member states may 
take measures in their national legal systems to pursue general interest 
objectives, in particular relating to content regulation and audio-visual 
policy. However, according to Article 1 (3a) of the same directive: 
“Measures taken by Member States regarding end-users’ access to, or use of, 
services and applications through electronic communications networks shall 
respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as 
guaranteed by the ECHR and general principles of Community law. Any of 
these measures regarding end-user’ access to, or use of, services and 
applications through electronic communications networks liable to restrict 
those fundamental rights or freedoms may only be imposed if they are 
appropriate, proportionate and necessary within a democratic society, and 
their implementation shall be subject to adequate procedural safeguards in 
conformity with the ECHR and with general principles of Community law, 
including effective judicial protection and due process. Accordingly, these 
measures may only be taken with due respect for the principle of the 
presumption of innocence and the right to privacy. A prior, fair and impartial 
procedure shall be guaranteed, including the right to be heard of the person 
or persons concerned, subject to the need for appropriate conditions and 
procedural arrangements in duly substantiated cases of urgency in 
conformity with the ECHR. The right to effective and timely judicial review 
shall be guaranteed.”  
Nevertheless, these safeguards developed by the case law of the ECtHR and 
inserted into the provision of the Framework Directive do apply only to the 
information society services that include broadcasting and online 
telecommunication services, excluding the content et al providers as defined 
in the Info Soc Directive which do not consist wholly or mainly in the 
conveyance of signals on electronic communications networks.139 Hence 
these safeguards could only apply to the internet access providers such as 
broadband providers. Even though Article 1(3) of the Framework Directive 
is designed to regulate the access of end-users to the services through 
electronic communications, which could imply that the access to all possible 
content online should be regulated according to the provisions of the ECHR 
and general principles of EC law, the following Article 2, which sets the 
definitions of the terms used in the Framework directive, states clearly that 
‘electronic communications service’ exclude content providers and more 
active (i.e. exercising editorial control over content), hosting providers. 
Consequently, it may be assumed that the blanket ban of the internet access 
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is generally prohibited. However, it could it be said that the ban of the 
particular website may be justified without any substantial procedural or 
judicial guarantees.  
 
3.3.2. The Pirate Bay  
The situation seems however to be slightly different with regard to more 
‘active’ hosting service providing ISP who have been convicted on a 
national level in facilitating the copyright infringements online.  
One of the most evident cases of the explicit conflict between copyright and 
freedom of expression before the ECtHR is the case of Neij and Sunde 
Kolmisoppi v. Sweden.140  
In this case, the applicants were running a popular torrent file sharing 
website The Pirate Bay, which is claimed to be commercially successful 
earning its revenues mostly from advertising.141 According to the applicants, 
all revenues are used to maintain the website and the website itself is not 
economically profitable.142 The website also received some voluntary 
donations from its users.143 
The applicants were accused before Swedish national courts of violating the 
Swedish Copyright Act by facilitating other persons’ infringement of 
copyright concerning music, films and computer games by providing others 
with the opportunity to upload torrent files to the website, as well as 
providing others with a database linked to a catalogue of torrent files. The 
applicants inter alia argued that by solely receiving and providing 
information about torrent files, TPB must be regarded as a service provider 
who cannot be criminally liable for an offence which relates to the content 
of the information.  
The applicants however were convicted before the national courts of 
complicity to commit crimes in violation of the Copyright Act and were 
sentenced to imprisonment, in addition to the order to pay damages of 30 
million kronor ($3.6 million) to entertainment companies.144 
The applicants complained under Article 10 of the ECHR before the ECtHR 
that their right to receive and impart information had been violated when 
they were convicted for other persons’ use of TPB. In their view, Article 10 
                                                 
140 Supra note 16. 
141 The Local, “Pirate Bay earned millions from advertising”, 30 September 2010. Available 
at: <http://www.thelocal.se/20100930/29334> 
142 Ibid; see also TPB official website ‘About’ section available at: 
<http://thepiratebay.se/about> 
143 TPB has published Bitcoin and LiteCoin links for digital money donations on their 
website. See also TorrentFreak, “The Pirate Bay Now Accepts Bitcoin donations”, 23 April 
2013.  Available at: <https://torrentfreak.com/the-pirate-bay-bitcoin-donations-130423/> 
144 Louise Nordstrom, “Pirate Bay: 4 Convicted In Sweden’s File-Sharing Trial”, The 
Huffington Post, 17 April 2009. Available at: 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/17/pirate-bay-4-convicted-in_n_188152.html> 
41 
 
 
protects the right to arrange a service on the internet which can be used for 
both legal and illegal purposes, without the persons responsible for the 
service being convicted for acts committed by the people using the service. 
The ECtHR found that the conviction of the applicants interfered with their 
freedom of expression. Such interference, according to the ECtHR, was 
prescribed by law, as it was based on the relevant national legislation 
concerning copyright and criminal law. Such conviction was also found to 
pursue one of the legitimate aims under Article 10 (2), i.e. “protection of the 
rights of others”: the protection of the plaintiffs’ copyright.  
The ECtHR pursued to the necessity test, where it outlined two competing 
interests in current case: the interest of the applicants to facilitate the sharing 
of the information on one hand, and the interest in protecting the rights of 
the copyright holders on the other. In this regard the ECtHR stressed a wide 
margin of appreciation enjoyed by the state in balancing these two 
competing interests.  
However, the commercial nature of TPB, even though the ECtHR stressed 
that Article 10 guarantees freedom of expression to ‘everyone’ without any 
distinction made according to whether the aim pursued is profit-making or 
not, was detrimental to the applicants in the necessity test. The fact that 
protection of the ‘information’ the applicants tried to rely on does not 
amount to the same level as that afforded to political expression and debate, 
implicates that the state enjoys a particularly wide margin of appreciation in 
this regard when it comes to balancing two competing interests. 
Consequently the applicants’ conviction met the pressing social need.  
What comes to the proportionality test, the Court simply stated that the 
imprisonment and the damages the applicants were awarded with were not 
disproportionate to the aim pursued, without any further elaboration on this 
point.  
The court’s reasoning in this case was in line with its previous case of 
competing interests deriving from freedom of expression and copyright 
protection: Ashby Donald and Others v. France.145 In this case the 
applicants were fashion photographers who published online photographs 
taken in a fashion show without the authorisation by the fashion houses, and 
thus infringed the latter’s copyright. The ECtHR stated that the possible 
infringement of freedom of expression is applicable to the current case, 
however this right was not found to be violated, as photographs were not 
related to an issue of general interest and rather concerned a kind of 
“commercial speech”.146 Furthermore, the photographs were distributed for 
commercial purposes, and thus could not enjoy the whole range of the 
protection guaranteed by Article 10.147 In addition, the photographs in 
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question were published on the website of a company run by the applicants 
with the aim of selling them or charging a fee to view them, thus directly 
profiting from the use of copyrighted material.  
According to this logic, it is difficult to justify copyright violations with the 
arguments of free speech according to the ECtHR, as most of the times the 
nature of “speech” in those cases before the ECtHR did not amount to the 
same level of protection that is granted to the political speech or the matters 
of ‘conventional’ public interest. 
Furthermore, according to Joseph Jones, it is possible to perceive file 
sharing of music and films as a desire to “expand cultural horizons” and that 
could be placed under the right to access to the culture that file sharing can 
foster.148 In this regard, Jones is arguing that the ECtHR, by denying the 
same level of protection to the material posted on TPB since its nature was 
not the matter of public interest, overlooked the argument that file sharing 
fosters access to culture.149 Second of all, file sharing is not only used for 
copyright infringements but also for exchanging information, ideas and 
opinions.150 Providing platform for that could in principle amount to the 
‘transmission of information’ protected under Article 10 according to the 
case law of the ECtHR.  
On the contrary to the Ashby Donald case, in the Pirate Bay case, the 
information shared on the website run by the applicants was freely 
accessible to the public and the commercial gain earned by the applicants 
was not directly gained from the content of such information, but 
advertising.  
Definitely it cannot be overlooked that the fact that TPB contained publicly 
available illegal content might have made this website to be so popular and 
frequently visited in the first place, thus making TPB an attractive platform 
for advertising. However, in addition to that it cannot be overlooked either 
that illegal content was not the only information shared through the website. 
Easily some additional attention of TPB users was drawn because of the 
ongoing legal battle between corporate entertainment industry and internet 
community in the war against piracy.151 The simple approach of the ECtHR 
relying on the wide margin of appreciation in the cases not concerning the 
matter of ‘public interests’ in TPB case, perhaps in addition completely 
overlooked the political activity of the Pirate Party and their politically 
active stand on the issues inter alia concerning copyright regulation, leading 
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to the so called Pirate Parties International movement with their national 
equivalents in several European countries.152 Hence, how commercial is the 
speech of TBP in the first place? 
It is peculiar to note that the sympathy of wider public is clearly directed to 
the ‘pirates’ and copyright infringers, rather than the victims such as 
entertainment companies, as the wider public is rather willing to pay the 
‘pirates’ to help them with the sanctioned fines for damages caused to the 
victims of copyright infringements, than to actually pay for intellectual 
property goods directly to these ‘victims’.153  
In addition, it is doubtful that TBP could rely on safe harbours provided in 
the e-Commerce Directive, as not only did the developers of the website 
receive the notifications from the affected copyright holders, but they also 
dedicated a whole section of ‘Legal Threats’ on TPB where the e-mails and 
notifications of right holders are published online with the responses to them 
which clearly mock the right holders.154 Doubtfully the owners of TPB can 
rely on the exception of unaware and ‘clueless’ hosting provider in regard to 
these copyright infringements under Article 14 of the e-Commerce 
Directive, where ISP shall act expeditiously to remove or disable access to 
information upon being notified of the infringement.  
 
3.4. Concluding remarks 
 
TPB case in the ECtHR has re-established some important principles. First 
of all, the ECtHR has established that conviction based on the complicit 
copyright infringements amount to the interference to the freedom of 
expression. That is an important step towards securing the freedom of 
expression against the claims of copyright infringements online.  
However, the ECtHR in regard to ISP is still quite reluctant to see outside of 
the scope of commercial speech that is in view of the ECtHR both protected 
in principle, however not so protected in reality.  
In this regard, two European courts, as close as they should be, seem to be 
quite distant from each other. While one, i.e. the ECJ, is prioritising trade 
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and economic value by overlooking fundamental rights and freedoms, the 
other, i.e. the ECtHR, is justifying the restrictions on free speech by the lack 
of public interest in profit-making activities. Two courts also do take a 
slightly different approach in regard to the blocking measures, mainly due to 
the fact that both courts do emphasise different rationales.  
In the case of TPB, it is problematic to state that political activity could 
justify the illegal activity, however, it is also dangerous to imply criminal 
sanctions deriving from any indirect liability on politically active persons. 
Furthermore, when conventional system of protection of copyright is being 
reassessed and reconceptualised, the views that “shock, offend and disturb 
the state or any sector of the population”155, even if they concern the 
‘sacred’ protection of copyright, must still be tolerated, or at least be 
properly assessed when restricted.   
The case law of the ECtHR has firmly established the principles of 
restrictions to freedom of expression, however, the ECJ is overlooking these 
tests when ruling on IP rights infringements online.  
The relationship between copyright, freedom of expression and the role of 
ISP as the guarantee of the proper balance of these competing interests are 
still quite unclear and varying from court to court, or even in the same court. 
The ECHR does provide an elaborated framework of principles and tests to 
take into consideration when assessing the liability of ISP, however, the 
case law of the ECtHR seems to not address this issue properly, especially 
where the legislation is silent.   
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4. Public interest exception to copyright 
protection 
4.1. Public interest of copyright 
 
In order to understand the importance of public interest allegedly enshrined 
into copyright protection it is noteworthy to remind ourselves of the ‘roots’ 
of the modern western copyright system.  
The nascency of modern copyright protection dates back to the year 1709 
and the Statute of Anne in England which was the product of a new 
communications technology, the printing press.156 Hence there is nothing 
surprising in the view that modern copyright laws have to be regularly 
modified in order to adapt to the new communications technology.157 
Originally, the response of the legislators by adopting the Statute was to 
break the monopoly of booksellers and printers and reinforce the role of the 
author in publishing and printing process.158 And that was said to benefit the 
larger public in general by encouraging the authors to publish their works 
and permit the widest possible dissemination of works to the public at 
large.159 The Statute was aimed at promoting the public’s interest in 
enhanced access to books and abolition of monopoly imposed by printing 
press.160  
From this historical perspective it is noteworthy to highlight two important 
points concerning copyright protection: 1) copyright has to change in 
accordance with technological changes (after all it was ‘born’ due to 
technology); and 2) the protection of authors has to benefit the society and 
larger public in general. As Sunimal Mendis expressed, “the scope of the 
private exclusive right that is accorded to the copyright owner should be 
defined within the scope of such public interest and that the exclusive 
rights/…/ should be suitably limited so as to prevent a copyright holder 
from deriving profit from his creation in a manner adverse to the legitimate 
interests of public.”161 Hence the ultimate goal of copyright protection and 
its strongest justification is the social benefit. 
However, as the Statute of Anne was the product of its time, heavily relying 
on the public’s interest, the second biggest landmark in the history of 
copyright, the adoption of the Berne Convention, was no less the product of 
its own time as well, that is legislative answer to the need to combat the 
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inter-state piracy of copyrighted works during the 19th century, when large 
exporters of copyrighted material such as Germany, England and France 
faced a phenomenon of reprinted cheaper works of their citizens being 
widely distributed in the same language-speaking countries.162 The creation 
of the Berne Convention, thus, can teach another historical lesson which is 
the adoption of internationally stronger rules in order to combat new forms 
of threats to the economic interests of right holders. Orit Fischman-Afori 
has called the Berne Convention “the original sin”, the reason behind 
current ongoing copyright wars in general.163  
Nevertheless, the reverse purpose of copyright has been widely discussed 
and commented on, however, it is agreed upon that today the public interest 
in access to and dissemination of works in order to benefit society seems to 
have become lost, and that there is a need of a more robust protection of the 
public interest in access to and dissemination of works in order to bring 
copyright law back in line with its original purpose.164 
It is also clear than no longer it is enough to rely on the fact that copyright in 
essence is internally securing freedom of expression by its own rules, e.g. 
because of the temporary nature of copyright protection, and the notion of 
public domain, that is the pool of unprotected or no longer protected works 
free to use and reuse. The length of protection has gradually increased since 
initial 14 years term in the Statute of Anne165, to lifelong + 70 years after 
death term according to current harmonisation in Europe.166 Due to the 
prolonging term of protection and expansion of protected works, the public 
domain is shrinking in favor of commercial ownership at expense of the 
interests of the end users of the works.167 In the end, who and what is the 
author without her public? No doubt the wider and larger dissemination of a 
cultural work benefits the author by driving the attention and expanding the 
possible number of consumers of her work which could lead to the 
subsequent economic benefits and advantages the copyright holders seem to 
fear and care so about.  
Nor does inherent concept of copyright itself, i.e. idea-expression 
dichotomy, provide any actual relief in the debate of copyright versus public 
interest. Commentators have expressed that it is often quite difficult to 
distinguish the idea from expression when they overlap, e.g. a photographic 
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work168, and the fact that there exist some situations when an individual’s 
right to express herself effectively depends on her being allowed to use a 
particular copyrighted expression.169 As an illustration to this case are, for 
example, documentary films that have often been stripped of clips, 
background shots and music, because of the alleged copyright 
infringements, although these uses of protected works would have “greatly 
enhanced poignancy, artistic quality, and historical elucidation of a 
documentary”.170 As a result, in Neil Natanel’s words, “a film that is 
supposed to be a documentary contains a bit of calculated untruth.”171 
Obviously, expression that is exclusively protected by copyright, conflicts 
with the freedom of individuals to express themselves however they see to 
fit.172  
It is clear that if copyright indeed did inherently solve the tension between 
right holders’ exclusive rights and public interest, the current ‘postmodern’ 
crisis of copyright would not exist, where the Renaissance-like ideas of an 
unique creator are not surviving the time-proof, as contemporary author is 
not author at all, but “is more deemed a collector, collage-maker, or scripter 
of our cultural past”.173 The paradigm and reality have changed, law 
however not so much.  
Commentators seem also to agree that the ultimate consumer of protected 
works is “neither heard nor heeded”174 in IP policy which is widely 
dominated by the interests of ‘producer’ of these works, and advocating for 
the change in the system for the greater public good.175 
The ease of reproduction and dissemination of works in the digital age has 
also produced an argument that right holders should accept that online 
activities cannot be policed in the same way as their offline equivalents can, 
i.e. digital copy is substantially different from its CD or DVD analogue 
which requires a specific knowledge and a costly equipment to produce.176 
Second of all, there is simply no offline equivalent to ISP in the first 
place177, however the equivalent of outcome178 of the regulation of ISP 
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liability should be still taken into consideration, i.e. the achievement of 
proper balance between the protection of right holders and the protection of 
public interest, which is the same function of copyright both online and 
offline.  
 
4.2. Public interest exceptions in Europe 
 
A set of limitations and exceptions to copyright protection is enshrined into 
the Info Soc Directive. According to recital 14, the Info Soc Directive seeks 
to promote learning and culture by protecting works and other subject-
matter while permitting exceptions or limitations in the public interest for 
the purpose of education and teaching. In this regard, it seems that the Info 
Soc Directive is permitting exceptions on the basis of public interest only if 
such interest is deriving from education and teaching purposes. 
Furthermore, recital 22 states that the objective of proper support for the 
dissemination of culture must not be achieved by sacrificing strict protection 
of rights or by tolerating illegal forms of distribution of counterfeited or 
pirated works. From this passage it, however, seems that European 
legislators acknowledge the importance of the dissemination of culture, but 
are not willing to sacrifice the strict protection of economic rights of IP 
rights holders.  
Recital 31 starts with the general statement about the need to safeguard a 
fair balance between different interests, and evolves into the assertion that 
the existing exceptions and limitations to the rights as set out by the member 
states have to be reassessed in the light of the new electronic environment, 
and ends with the acknowledgement that in order to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market, such exceptions and limitations should be 
defined more harmoniously. 
Finally, in recital 34, the Info Soc Directive provides the examples of 
plausible limitations based on the public interest, i.e. certain exceptions or 
limitations for cases such as educational and scientific purposes, for the 
benefit of public institutions such as libraries and archives, for purposes of 
news reporting, for quotations, for use by people with disabilities, for public 
security uses and for uses in administrative and judicial proceedings. Recital 
38 mentions the exception for private use of audio, visual and audiovisual 
material accompanied by fair compensation. 
Series of limitations are enshrined in Article 5. The right to reproduction can 
be, for example, restricted in respect of reproductions on any medium made 
by a natural person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor 
indirectly commercial179; in respect of specific acts of reproduction made by 
                                                                                                                            
178 Reed, 252. 
179 Article 5(2)(b) of Info Soc Directive.  
49 
 
 
publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments or museums, or by 
archives, which are not for direct or indirect economic or commercial 
advantage180; or in respect of reproductions of broadcasts made by social 
institutions pursuing non-commercial purposes, such as hospitals or 
prisons181. In this regard, the use of protected works has to be for non-
commercial purposes and, where necessary, provided with fair remuneration 
for the right holders. Article 5(3) allows for further exceptions of the right to 
reproduction and the right to making available to the public: e.g. use for the 
sole purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research182; 
reproduction by the press, communication to the public or making available 
of published articles on current economic, political or religious topics183; 
quotations for purposes such as criticism or review184; incidental inclusion 
of a work or other subject-matter in other material185; use for the purpose of 
caricature, parody or pastiche186; use in certain other cases of minor 
importance where exceptions or limitations already exist under national law, 
provided that they only concern analogue uses187.  
As it has already been mentioned before in Chapter 2 of current thesis, the 
only exception explicitly concerning ISP is the exception provided in 
Article 5(1) concerning temporary acts of reproduction, which are transient 
or incidental [and] an integral and essential part of a technological process 
and whose sole purpose is to enable a transmission in a network between 
third parties by an intermediary. This exception also happens to be the only 
mandatory limitation to the right of reproduction, whilst all other limitations 
are merely optional188 the member states are free to pick and choose from.189 
Despite the fact that the Info Soc Directive provides numerous cases of 
allowed exceptions and limitations, the list of these exceptions to the right 
of reproduction and to the right of communication to the public is 
exhaustive according to the recital 32. In the case of exceptions with regard 
to digital world Article 5(3)(o) or the so-called “grandfather clause”190, 
explicitly permits the introduction of limitations concerning only the 
analogue use of protected works. What comes to the digital private copying, 
recital 38 states that this kind of copying “is likely to be more widespread 
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and have a greater economic impact”, and therefore a distinction between 
analogue and digital copies should be made in certain respects. Hence, the 
Info Soc Directive is clearly making a distinction between digital and non-
digital world, whilst expanding the rights of copyright holders to the digital 
world without much gain for the intermediaries in this respect.  
Several commentators have expressed the opinion, that the fact that the Info 
Soc Directive establishes an exhaustive list of no less than 20 optional 
exceptions, many of which are drafted in inflexible technology-specific 
language not only fails in achieving the harmonization goal it so ambitiously 
strokes to achieve, but also produces no legal certainty, nor serves the public 
interest.191 
Such close list of exceptions, including the ‘grandfather clause’, forms not 
only an effective obstacle to the introduction of a broad general exception to 
copyright deriving from the public interest192, but is also incompatible with 
the Agreed Statements concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty193 that 
permit contracting parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are 
appropriate in the digital network environment.194 Therefore, the Info Soc 
Directive assuredly takes the protection of copyright holders much further 
than originally intended by the international IP treaties that were the base 
for the Info Soc Directive.  
 
4.3. The need for legislative response to ISP liability 
 
As highlighted above in Chapter 2, the e-Commerce Directive provides with 
a ‘notice and take down’ system in its Article 14. According to Article 14(3) 
of the e-Commerce Directive, member states are free to establish procedures 
governing the removal or disabling of access to information by ISP. The 
absence of clear guidelines of such procedures, in addition with burdensome 
interpretation of the ECJ who places upon an intermediary the role of a 
responsible, diligent and independent investigator with the threat of the 
court’s blocking injunction without any prior judicial guarantees that might 
not be disproportionate with the fundamental rights of the end users, puts 
ISP in a difficult position with the responsibilities of a public authority. 
The encouragement in the EU of private actions taken by ISP with an 
attitude of ‘act now, act later’ is said to have a chilling effect on free 
expression online as well as on the potential of socially valuable technology 
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such as P2P file sharing.195 In the fear of further sanctions, including the 
possible following liability for copyright infringements, ISP would rather 
take down or block the access to the information that allegedly infringes 
copyright, especially, when there are no rules concerning such notifications 
or at least the possibility of defence against such claims.196 
Another problematic approach is the self-regulation imposed by ISP in order 
to prevent and stop illegal activity online, including the rules of the ‘notice 
and take down’ system. While there are no guidelines on the question of 
what is a proper notice of copyright infringement in neither the e-Commerce 
Directive or in the legislation of most of the European countries197, the 
procedure is left to ISP to decide and self-regulate upon. Such self-
regulatory schemes are said to be flexible and less burdensome than 
statutory regulation, however they usually lack the procedural fairness and 
protection for fundamental rights that are ensured by independent judicial 
and parliamentary scrutiny.198 Furthermore, in the absence of statutory 
provisions regarding needed actions taken by ISP in order to prevent or stop 
illegal activity, ISP often rely on their own codes of conduct which are 
usually agreed upon between the stakeholders most directly concerned.199 
These stakeholders are most likely to secure their own business interests and 
often overlook the large public while developing these codes of conduct.200 
Furthermore, when even the proper assessment with compatibility with 
fundamental rights and freedom is left to and encouraged to be regulated by 
a private actor as ISP, as it was inter alia interpreted by the ECJ, regulation 
of copyright is moving from statecentered, public enforcement to 
decentered, private enforcement.201 Such shift is a favourable ground for 
private censorship, when copyright claims can be and are used for 
suppressing freedom of speech and dissemination of unfavourable 
information, as, for example, in the case of the online host WikiLeaks who 
hosted sensitive data provided by the whistleblower Bradley Manning, 
which included military footage of US helicopters shooting civilians.202 
After governmental pressure on several ISP, including credit card 
companies and PayPal to suspend all payments to the WikiLeaks owners, 
the attempt to host WikiLeaks data on Amazon servers failed, as the content 
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was removed from Amazon servers on the basis of copyright 
infringement.203  
In addition, when it comes to the balancing of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, the decision making should not be in the hands of self-regulatory 
private businesses, as there is a trend amongst ISP to quickly shut down an 
allegedly infringing website, even if such a claim is “completely bogus”.204 
Privatised approach to the ‘notice and take down’ rules, as well as a trend 
towards self-regulation, including ISP entering into private agreements with 
content providers, magnifies users’ public choice and due process problems, 
since users have “no voice in the negotiations of private agreements and 
little to no say in whatever takedown process companies establish”.205 
Consequently, according to Pangiota Theodoropoulou, the role of state has 
to re-established, in order to increase the democratic legitimacy of the 
restrictive measures by placing restrictive decisions applied by private 
sector under appropriate scrutiny. 206 
In the end, it is the state who is the main duty-bearer when it comes to the 
protection and securement of human rights, and thus it is quite 
disproportionate to place such a heavy burden of assessing the public 
interest on the private actor, especially when public interest is already quite 
disproportionately underrepresented in the copyright system, whilst state is 
prioritising the protection of property rights and economic interests of right 
holders. 
Second of all, if human rights based approach views information and 
communication technologies as a tool to improve the enjoyment of human 
rights such as the freedom of expression by seeking universal access by all 
to information and services207, it is quite difficult to find justification why 
primary enhancers of such access such as ISP should be treated differently 
than other intermediaries who currently benefit from the existing 
exceptions.  
 
4.4. Possible “new” exception to copyright protection 
 
4.4.1. Info Soc Directive  
As has already been mentioned in the section 4.2. the list of possible 
exceptions provided in the Info Soc Directive for member states to choose 
from is exhaustive, as stated in recital 32 of the Directive. In regard to ISP, 
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the only exception that is applicable to them is the one mentioned in Article 
5(1) concerning temporary acts of reproduction, which are transient or 
incidental and an integral and essential part of a technological process. 
According to established case law of the ECJ, the conditions provided in 
this exception which derogate from a general principle established by that 
directive must be interpreted strictly.208 Hence, there is no possibility to 
include into this exception a wider scope of ISP whose services are more 
‘active’ than merely technical.  
The introduction of a completely new exception is, however, restricted due 
to recital 32. Sunimal Mendis has expressed the view that there exists a 
possibility to overcome the impediment placed by the Info Soc Directive by 
making an argument that recital 32 contravenes the basic principle of EC 
law, i.e. the principle of proportionality.209 According to this principle 
which is recognised in the EU law, the measures implemented through EC 
law, as well as derogations to fundamental freedoms have to be appropriate 
for attaining the objective pursued, and must not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve it.210 
In this regard, deriving from recitals 1, 6, and 7 of the Info Soc Directive, it 
is apparent that the objectives of the directive are inter alia, to remedy the 
legislative differences and legal uncertainty that exists in relation to 
copyright protection that has also been noted by the ECJ in Svensson 
case.211 In that particular case, the ECJ did not allow to interpret the Info 
Soc Directive to allow adopting a measure that granted wider protection to 
copyright holders by laying down a wider range of activities to the concept 
of communication to the public than those referred to in the Info Soc 
Directive.212 The ECJ did not even find such increase of protection to be 
acceptable, based on Article 20 of the Berne Convention which allows the 
signatory countries to enter into ‘special agreements’ among themselves 
with a view to granting copyright holders more extensive rights than those 
laid down in the Berne Convention.213 
Hence, from this argumentation it is sufficient to conclude that 
harmonisation of EC law is the ultimate purpose of the Info Soc Directive, 
including the legal certainty deriving from such harmonisation that is not 
even impeded by other international agreements.  
However, as inter alia argued by Sunimal Mendis, the exhaustive list of 
exceptions to copyright protection included in Article 5 does not achieve 
this goal, especially when the list is not only unable to predict all possible 
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instances of conflict between copyright and freedom of expression, but also 
does not achieve any further harmonisation because the exhaustive list in 
itself is not mandatory.214 Hence, the exhaustive list is certainly not 
necessary to achieve the goal of legal certainty and harmonisation of 
copyright law in EC, especially at the expense of freedom of expression of 
both ISP and the wider public.  
This approach compliments the view to base the limitations to copyright 
protection on fundamental rights and freedoms of the users which are of 
equal value as the exclusive right of copyright holders and not mere 
interests to be taken into consideration.215  
 
4.4.2. The three-step test 
In order to introduce exceptions to copyright protection under limitations 
provided in Article 5(3) of the Info Soc Directive member states’ discretion 
is limited by Article 5(5) of the Info Soc Directive, which makes the 
introduction of the exception subject to three conditions (so-called ‘three-
step test’), which are, first, that the exception may be applied only in certain 
special cases, second, that it does not conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work and, finally, that it does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the copyright holder.216  
Originally the three-step test was introduced in Article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention for the possible exceptions to the right to reproduction 
(emphasis added):  
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the 
reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author”.  
Since then, it has been incorporated into TRIPS Agreement in its Article 
13217 that is applicable to all possible limitations or exceptions to exclusive 
rights, thus going beyond its original intention to limit the right to 
reproduction in the Berne Convention, and constituting a strong restriction 
on the ability of states to introduce exceptions to any of the exclusive rights 
of the copyright monopoly.218 The way the three-step test is used has also 
been argued to restrict any possible further introduction of exceptions even 
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if it is in public interest as long as it diminishes the economic interests of the 
authors.219 This strict interpretation and application of the test has been said 
to fail to take into account the changes in social, cultural or commercial 
conditions, as well as the developments in technology.220 However, it is 
important to bear in mind that the whole existence of the three-step test 
indicates that the exclusive rights granted by IP legislation are not 
absolute221 and should not be absolute. Thus the three-step test should not in 
any case be an ultimate obstacle for the introduction of new exceptions. 
However, the current existing international interpretation of the test is 
through the gaze of copyright holder.222   
On international level the first interpretation of the case was given in the 
decision of the WTO Panel on United States – Section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act (‘US Copyright Act dispute’).223 The dispute concerned 
section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act which permitted the public 
performance or display of musical works delivered via a broadcast in certain 
retail and food or drinking establishments, subject to size and audio-visual 
equipment limitations, divided into “home style” and “business style” 
exemptions. This decision has been widely criticised and commented on, 
however it gives some guidelines to interpret the cornerstone of the current 
copyright protection. The interpretation of the test has even gone so far that 
even the cases of the ‘fair use’ doctrine are said to be incompatible with the 
test224, as it was inter alia proven in the US Copyright Act dispute, where 
the WTO Panel found that business exemption to copyright provided in the 
US legislation was not compatible with Article 13 of TRIPS Agreement.225  
First the three conditions of the test were interpreted by the WTO Panel as 
cumulative conditions: failure to comply with any one of the three 
conditions results in the Article 13 exception being disallowed.226 Secondly, 
the WTO Panel did heavily emphasise the economic statistics behind the 
compatibility with the first step of the test, i.e. ‘certain special cases’ which 
scope in Panel’s words has to be “qualitatively and quantitatively 
narrow”.227 According to Panel’s reasoning the business style exemption 
was not compatible with Article 13 of TRIPS since it covered “a substantial 
majority of eating and drinking establishments and close to half of retail 
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establishments are covered by the exemption”.228 The home style 
exemption, on the other hand, was in compliance with the test, as from a 
quantitative perspective the reach of this exemption in respect of potential 
users is limited to a comparably small percentage of all eating, drinking and 
retail establishments in the United States.229 From this purely quantitative 
point of view in assessing the first step of the test, i.e. ‘certain special 
cases’, ISP could face some difficulties since the exception that goes beyond 
‘the mere technical’ nature of ISP can significantly increase the number of 
potential users of this exception and thus be incompatible with the notion of 
‘certain special cases’. 
Step ‘two’ of the test provides that the exception must not be in conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work. From this perspective, the Panel has 
held that the notion “normal” is not equated with full use of all exclusive 
rights conferred by copyright, and therefore means something less than full 
use of an exclusive right.230 However, once again a heavy reliance on the 
market loss of copyright holders due to the exemption followed in the WTO 
Panel’s decision. The Panel held that a conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work rises if uses exempted under the exception or limitation enter into 
economic competition with the ways that right holders normally extract 
economic value from that right to the work.231 At the same time, the WTO 
Panel acknowledged that not every use of a work, which in principle is 
covered by the scope of exclusive rights and involves commercial gain, 
necessarily conflicts with a normal exploitation of that work.232 That would 
imply that the fact that ISP indirectly commercially gain from the protected 
material distributed and disseminated through their services would not 
automatically preclude them from benefitting from the exception. However,  
in the light of the fact that cultural industries have been heavily relying on 
their economic loss due to the digital file sharing in the debates of ISP 
liability, and the fact that the right to reproduction or ‘making the copy’ is 
the essence of copyright233, solely on the linguistic basis already, it seems 
that the new wider exception to copyright protection would be impeded by 
this kind of reasoning concerning ‘normal’ exploitation of the work based 
on heavy market driven rationale. 
Finally, the third step, i.e. the exception does not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the right holder, gives a slightly better chance to 
manoeuvre in order to introduce a new exception based on public interest.  
In this regard, the WTO Panel stressed that prejudice or “damage, harm or 
injury” to the interest of right holders has to reach a level beyond reasonable 
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in order to be incompatible with the step ‘three’ of the test.234 Such wording 
indicates that certain level of prejudice to legitimate interests of right holder 
is acceptable and justified.235 The WTO Panel acknowledged that legitimate 
interests are not necessarily limited to the economic value of the exclusive 
rights, but it is one way to estimate such interest.236 However, because this 
economic approach in the Panel’s words is an “incomplete and thus 
conservative”237 way of looking at legitimate interests, Robert Wright has 
argued that the Panel did acknowledge the possibility to include a wider 
social value policy considerations in the interpretation of the third step of 
the test.238 In this regard, public interest in the form of access to the 
information may be used as a wider social value policy in including a wider 
range of ISP under exemption from liability.  
However, because the steps of the test have been interpreted to be 
cumulative, the fact that ISP exception could be more possible under one 
step than the other is of little importance, including the arguments 
concerning the need to reread the test starting from the last step in order to 
find a proper proportionate balance between different interests239.  Hence, a 
broader exception that includes a wider range of ISP based on the public 
interest would most likely be incompatible with the three-step test.  
 
4.5. Possible ways to overcome the obstacle of the ‘three-
step test’ towards freedom of expression 
 
It seems that because the impact of freedom of expression is not measurable 
in euros and market efficiency, its inclusion into copyright debate as 
interpreted by the WTO and enforced by the TRIPS Agreement which is 
claimed “to have teeth”240, is quite tricky.  
From the economic perspective exceptions and limitations to copyright has 
been shown to both reduce the market value of the works, as well as address 
the issue of market failures, and thus be justified by the market needs.241 
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With respect to technological advances the new means of dissemination and 
reproduction can justify the need for a new exception when for example the 
transactional cost for licencing every individual use of the work will be 
significantly relative to the value of the work itself and then the exception 
would allow a greater access to the work which could otherwise become lost 
under the deadweight of the work: i.e. when production cost falls and more 
creative works are produced.242 Hence, there exists a possibility to justify 
new exception based on the technological nature of ISP by arguing that the 
exception would address the market inefficiencies. However, as also argued 
by Langus et al, the new exception might be unnecessary when the new 
business models would efficiently address the same issue of market 
inefficiency and the lower administrative cost, e.g. licencing through 
collective societies etc.243 
In regard to the three-step test, Daniel Gervais argues that, in essence, the 
test is the “two-step test” and the issue between new technologies and 
copyright rises under criteria of ‘normal exploitation’ and ‘prejudice with 
the legitimate interests of right holders’.244 Gervais is arguing that the 
internet has changed the notion of ‘normal exploitation’ and thus it is 
essential to view that criterion as influenced by technological development 
and consumer behaviour.245 The test should also be reversed to the possible 
effect of the use and not the nature of such use.246 Hence, the effect that 
requires stricter protection is significant commercial use. However, such 
effect-based rereading of the test would potentially benefit only the ‘private 
use’ exception designed for end users, as it is usually non-commercial and 
thus automatically does not prejudice the legitimate interests of right holders 
per se. It would not gain much help to the private commercial actors such as 
ISP and result once again in evaluation of the market situation. 
Many commentators advocate for the ‘fair use’-like open norm regulation of 
exceptions. ‘Fair use’ is a common law doctrine, a judicial tool that applies 
to any copyright-protected work as an exception and is claimed to provide a 
necessary flexibility in order to be adaptable to diverse situations.247 ‘Fair 
use’ is claimed to relieve the tensions between graduated response laws like 
French HADOPI and the interests of end users if these laws would adopt 
some elements of ‘fair use’: allowing users to stream music instead of 
downloading and express their identity by posting protected material on 
social networks and not considering it as infringing activity.248 Edward 
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Carter is supporting “common-sense extensions of copyright exceptions” 
under the three-step test because of technological challenges and new 
opportunities the internet is giving to both authors and users249, saying that 
“fair use is a last line of defense against an apparent global-technology 
driven tendency of copyright law to assign ownership even to public 
information and ideas”.250 Closed-norm copyright exceptions are claimed to 
fail to adequately secure the interests deriving from free expression251 and 
flexible fair use exceptions should acquire international acceptance.252 ‘Fair 
use’ is also said to be one of the best doctrines in order to rethink copyright 
without changing the basic set of copyrights.253 ‘Fair use’ exception could 
approach the issue of search engines to be placed under the e-Commerce 
rules Europe is facing right now, i.e. in the US, there is no such issue what 
so ever as copies of work appearing in search results are considered to be 
‘fair use’.254 
However, because of the attempted harmonisation of copyright law in 
Europe, the fair use exception will be most likely unable to achieve such 
goal, as most likely it will not serve the aim of legal certainty. As already 
previously mentioned, fair use will not always be compatible with the three-
step test either.  
Human rights based approach is also heavily relied on in the debate of 
‘public interest versus three-step test’. The inclusion of normative 
considerations255 and nationally prevailing attitudes256 into interpretation has 
been said to help to find the proper balance between different interests. 
Furthermore, even the WTO Appellate Body has acknowledged the fact that 
the WTO Agreement “is not to be read in clinical isolation from public 
international law.”257 Despite that acknowledgment, it seems that WTO is 
exactly doing the opposite: excluding socio-cultural policies from the 
interpretation of allowed exceptions. 
Another approach to face the challenges brought by the internet is rather 
radical. One of the proposed ways to answer these challenges is to replace a 
current bundle of rights with the single one: a general right to exploit and 
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disseminate.258 A single open-ended right is claimed to better handle new 
technological developments, including the technological neutrality in legal 
language.259 Technological neutrality is defined as the principle that 
“copyright law should apply in an equal manner to different technologies 
that express the same work”260, in the sense that copyright regulation should 
not discriminate the new technologies both by adding additional liability 
rules to ISP and end users who access the works through different media.261 
In any case, some rules need to be in place in order to address online 
conduct. Even if a single technologically neutral right will reduce the 
liability of ISP in some cases, the possibility to infringe the right of the 
authors to exploit on the internet will remain and the rules of ISP liability 
shall apply.  
The combination of technological neutral approach of the courts, and the 
focus on beneficial results of the activity with the adaptive ‘fair use’ 
doctrine in order to provide a mechanism for securing digital access to 
collective culture is also appearing in scholar literature.262 
However, while law is catching up with the changing reality, new business 
models should be in place.263 In order to make illegal file sharing or 
downloading unappealing, the right holders should not just demand 
‘sacrifices’ from end users and intermediaries at the cost of their freedom of 
speech but instead give something up from their side as well. Some of the 
suggestions for these new market models were already given in 2001 by 
Shira Perlmutter who suggested digital copies to be sold at a lower cost than 
their analogues, or placing an additional value to the available legitimate 
sources such as suggestions to the similar artists, for example, not available 
through pirate platforms, as well as affordable monthly subscriptions.264 No 
doubt some of the most successful ‘legitimate’ ways to consume protected 
material online is streaming services such as Spotify that provides a market 
model similar to one as suggested by Perlmutter, with their rather low cost 
monthly subscriptions, possibilities to explore the similar music scene 
according to the costumised taste, and without any actual downloading 
(read: reproduction of the work). However, there also exists a view that 
Spotify does not eliminate the problem of ‘right holders versus public 
interest’, as it is securing the existing monopoly of ‘artistic elite’ (or to be 
more precise, the major labels who are interested in strong control over 
dissemination of works) when end users are staying solely passive 
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consumers of cultural goods without participating in shaping the 
encompassing cultural society.265 
In any case, the question of ISP liability is inherently connected to the 
existing body of copyright. There is no liability question without the 
infringement, and no infringement if there is no right or provision to 
infringe. Hence in order to reconceptualise the law on ISP liability towards 
the inclusion of freedom of expression concerns, the law of copyright has to 
be reconceptualised at the same time.   
The question of ISP liability might be relieved if already existing exceptions 
provided under the Info Soc Directive would work in the direction of public 
interest. However, there exists some controversy over ‘private copying’ 
exception in the EU copyright law266 and its special significance in the 
digital world when copies made for private use are still disseminated and 
made publicly available, thus overstepping the allegedly unreachable for 
right holders’ economic interests privacy of use. The line between 
traditional distinction of private, i.e. tolerated, and public, i.e. unauthorised 
use in copyright system is blurred.267 Whilst copyright has entered into 
private lives of end users, the private copying limitation has not expanded in 
reverse.268 
Jens Schovsbo is arguing for introduction of equal rights for consumers in 
copyright framework in order to rebalance copyright system towards “other 
side”, i.e. more effective inclusion of end users. These rights include 
reproduction and communication to the public of copyrighted works in 
order to engage in democratic use, information use, transformative use, 
personal use, and reasonable commercial use, which should belong to users 
and be equal with the rights of copyright holders.269 
Yet the law is moving forward shaped by the technological challenges of 
Web 2.0 or “participative web” where end users of the internet are able to 
develop, rate, collaborate and customise the online services they are 
using270, although with baby steps. The European Commission has created a 
User-Generated Content Working Group whose purpose is to “identify 
relevant forms of licencing and how to improve information for end-
users”.271 The discussions on possible exception for user-created content 
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started in the European Commission in 2008.272 However, it seems that the 
current focus in the EU concerning the UGC is rather on the scope of 
licensing than the actual change in the copyright framework towards new 
limitations.    
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5. Conclusion 
 
The provisions concerning ISP liability for copyright infringements 
committed by third parties came to existence and were shaped as they are 
today at the change of millennium with the development of digital world. 
Since that time Web 1.0 was replaced with 2.0 and soon be replaced by 3.0, 
however, the courts struggle to apply the law designed for 1.0 and no doubt 
why: the law simply cannot catch up with the rapid technological change 
and development when it is rigid, strict and inflexible.  
As the liability of ISP is most often secondary in online world when the 
service itself is legal and clean, the question of ISP liability and its 
connection to public interest is similarly secondary. First, in order to 
demand respect for public interest and freedom of expression online from 
private sector, the legislator should before everything secure that the laws 
are able to provide such opportunity and in reverse secure the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of wider public. Based on the current EU legislation 
concerning copyright protection in the information society, backed up with 
the ‘biting’ WTO, the copyright system takes human rights in consideration 
as long as it serves the economic interests of right holders.  
In this regard, ISP can in principle rely on the arguments deriving from their 
own or public’s freedom of expression, however, in practice the success of 
such claims is limited to the conventionally important political speech 
which ISP based on their private business-like nature have little to do with.  
Although both IP rights and freedom of expression are granted the status of 
human right which is non-absolute and thus limited, it seems that it is 
economically profitable to limit the latter than the former simply because 
the benefits of free speech are not measurable in euros or any other 
equivalent currency. And yet, copyright owes its creation to public interest 
and ultimately has to serve it. Positive law can be regarded legitimate as 
long as its aims are general societal well-being and common good.273  
To state that ISP can benefit from a new expanded exception to copyright 
protection under the EU directives based on public interest is rather early. 
Not only does the Info Soc Directive place restrictions on the possible 
introduction of new exceptions not mentioned in the directive, but new 
exception will be most likely incompatible with the three-step test under 
both the Info Soc Directive and the TRIPS Agreement, according to the 
current interpretation of the test.  Nevertheless the rules concerning ISP 
liability have to be revised based on simple fact that proper balance between 
private and public interests has to be in the hands of state: self-regulation of 
the ‘notice and take down’ system can foster private censorship not in 
favour of end users and thus, self-regulation must be accompanied with 
                                                 
273 Thomas Aquinas cited in Geiger, 349. 
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proper judicial review not only after the restrictive measures are taken by 
ISP on demands of copyright holders or governmental pressure, but also 
prior to these measures. The rules of injunctions and proper notifications of 
the infringement need to be specified and harmonised, as the internet and 
the services provided therein are nation-neutral and borderless. 
It is the time for freedom of expression to step out from the shadow of 
extensive copyright protection and achieve the proper attention it deserves, 
especially in the information age where access to that information is crucial. 
Copyright and its protection have acquired enough attention and there is no 
need to sacrifice freedom of expression in order to tame the technology.  
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